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Competition policy can be defined as “the set of policies and laws which ensure
that competition in the marketplace is not restricted in such a way as to reduce
economic welfare” (Motta, 2004, p. 30). In the last decades, there has been a
paradigm shift in the approach to competition policy in most developed economies.
Under the heading of a “more economic approach”, the basis of decision-making
in competition cases has changed from a form-based approach where decisions
are made based on relatively simple per-se rules to an effects-based approach
building on case-specific economic analyses.
Under a form-based approach, certain forms of firm conduct are considered
detrimental to welfare per-se and are therefore prohibited. An effects-based
approach is based on the insight that the impact of firm behavior on welfare
depends on the particular circumstances of each case, that is, characteristics of
the market in question such as the type of products and competition as well as the
structure of demand have to be taken into account when assessing whether certain
firm behavior is detrimental to welfare. The effect of firm conduct on welfare can
therefore hardly be generalized in a set of simple rules applying to all industries
and cases but has to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis (Röller and Stehmann,
2006).
The increased influence of economic arguments in competition policy can to
a large extent be attributed to the application of game theoretic methods to the
analysis of (imperfectly) competitive markets. One of the pioneers in this area,
Jean Tirole, received the 2014 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in
Memory of Alfred Nobel for his work on market power and regulation. Because
markets and firms are constantly changing and evolving, the policy shift also
necessitates further economic analyses in order to strengthen and deepen the
understanding of imperfectly competitive markets and in order to be able to better
identify and understand the effects of firm conduct on economic welfare.
1
1. INTRODUCTION 2
This thesis consists of self-contained analyses of three current topics in the
field of competition policy in order to contribute to the understanding of firm
behavior and in order to derive policy implications based on rigorous economic
arguments. In Chapter 2, the impact of (a reduction of) complexity on welfare in
competition cases is analyzed in a setting where asymmetric parties can acquire
information to help their case and submit it to the decision-maker. In Chapter 3,
the price effects of horizontal mergers as well as the incentives of firms to merge
are analyzed in a bidding market. Finally, in Chapter 4, the impact of different
pricing schemes on firms’ incentives to collude is analyzed in a differentiated-
products market. In the remainder of this introduction, the motivation of the three
main chapters of the present thesis is reviewed and the main results are presented.
The model in the second chapter entitled “Searching for evidence: less can
be more” is joint work with David Kusterer and Achim Wambach. One conse-
quence of the shift toward an effects-based approach in competition policy is the
increased complexity of all cases. For example, concerning merger cases, the
European Commission (EC) states: “[t]he recent trend that transactions become
more complex has continued in 2013. Second phase investigations in particular
generally require sophisticated quantitative and qualitative analyses involving
large amounts of data” (European Commission, 2014, p. 25). Complexity itself
may not be an issue, however it may become an issue if the involved firms and
competition authorities cannot adjust to it in a similar fashion. This causes an
imbalance or asymmetry between the parties (Neven, 2006): while firms can
more easily increase their budget for legal and/or economic advice if necessary,
government agencies face binding budget constraints and may be unable to in-
crease their workforce or keep enough competent staff on their payroll. This
asymmetry may in turn lead to decisions based on biased information and welfare
losses.
In a setting where a decision-maker has to decide on an issue but is uninformed
and has to rely on two biased parties that may search for multiple pieces of
information and submit it to her, we find that reducing complexity may increase
search activity and welfare. The two parties derive positive utility only if the
decision is made in their favor and we assume the parties to be asymmetric in
the utility they derive. Applied to a competition policy case, one party may be
1. INTRODUCTION 3
a group of firms filing for a merger and the other party may be the competition
authority aiming to prevent the merger if it is detrimental to welfare. In this
case, we assume that the (monetary) benefit of a cleared merger to the involved
firms by far outweighs the (potentially non-monetary) benefit of the (bureaucrats
of the) competition authority in case of a blocked merger.1 Both parties can
simultaneously search for information on multiple dimensions where the number
of dimensions is interpreted as the complexity of a case. We assume that the
privileged party always searches for information on all dimensions. If the utility
of the disadvantaged party is too low to engage in any search for information
initially, we show that a reduction of complexity, that is, a reduction of the number
of dimensions evidence is accepted from, can increase search incentives of this
party. The reduction of complexity attenuates the imbalance between the parties
and makes search more attractive to the disadvantaged party.
The decision-maker aims to maximize welfare but is not informed about the
state and also cannot observe search activity by the two parties. If the decision-
maker is not fully informed because one of the parties does not search on all
dimensions, she may make the wrong decision by deciding in favor of one party
although more information exists but is not discovered in favor of the other
party. We show that a reduction of complexity can lead to an increased search
activity by the disadvantaged party which translates into more and more balanced
information available to the decision-maker. For an initially large enough number
of dimensions, we show that a reduction of complexity can lead to an increase of
welfare.
The model in the third chapter entitled “Mergers in bidding markets” is joint
work with Achim Wambach. In this chapter, we analyze the price effects of
horizontal mergers and the incentives to merge in bidding markets. An ideal
bidding market can be defined as a market in which (i) goods are traded by
means of an auction, (ii) each contract is significant in size, (iii) each contract is
awarded to one (winning) party only, and (iv) the fact that one player has won a
1Our model does not only apply to competition cases but also to regulation, white-collar
crime, and informational lobbying with competing interest groups. Examples of lobbying cases
where the benefit of a favorable decision may differ significantly between interest groups include
tobacco companies competing with consumer protection groups or oil companies lobbying for
drilling rights or the legalization of fracking against environmental protection interest groups.
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previous auction does not improve (or worsen) his future position (Klemperer,
2007). In a number of recent cases, competition authorities have cleared mergers
in bidding markets despite leading to high market shares of the merged firm with
the argument that in bidding markets, it is not market shares that indicate market
power but the (lack) of competitors.2 This special treatment has been criticized by
economists on the grounds that specific price-formation processes do not affect
the implications of mergers for competition (see Klemperer, 2007; Rasch and
Wambach, 2013).
We analyze the price effects of horizontal mergers as well as the incentives
to merge in a dynamic bidding market with sequentially arriving consumers
where firms have exogenous capacities. We find that a horizontal merger without
efficiency gains increases current and future equilibrium prices only if the largest
firm is involved in the merger or if a new largest firm is created through the
merger. Current and future prices are not affected by a merger if the largest firm is
not involved and even decrease temporarily in case of a ‘catch-up’ merger, that is,
if a merger creates a firm just as large as the previously largest firm. We find that
a large number of mergers does not have adverse effects on consumer welfare,
in contrast to standard merger models. Our findings are also in contrast to the
current practice of the EC of assessing market power in bidding markets. Our
analysis suggests that the involvement of the firm with the largest capacity or the
change of the identity of the largest firm is the key determinant of adverse price
effects, independent of the number of active competitors.
Concerning the incentives to merge, we find that a merger between the largest
firm and any number of rivals with a smaller capacity is always profitable for
all firms in the market because the largest firm is able to sell each additional
unit of capacity with a larger probability and at higher prices post-merger while
the outsiders free ride on increased prices of the insiders. When smaller firms
merge to become the new largest firm in the market, the profitability of the merger
depends on a trade-off. The increase in equilibrium prices allows the merged firm
to sell its units at higher prices than pre-merger, resulting in an increase in profit.
2Cases include Raytheon/Thales (European Commission, 2001), Metronet/Infraco (Euro-
pean Commission, 2002), Boeing/Hughes (European Commission, 2004), and Oracle/Peoplesoft
(European Commission, 2005) on the EU level as well as Hochtief/Philipp Holzmann (Bun-
deskartellamt, 1998) and Webasto/Edscha (Bundeskartellamt, 2009) in Germany.
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However, the probability of selling a unit for the merged firm is reduced by the
merger, which is to the detriment of the merged firm. Depending on the strengths
of the effects, the merger can either be profitable or unprofitable. All outsider
firms profit due to the increased prices. In case of a ‘catch-up’ merger by smaller
firms, the merger is unprofitable for the merging firms and the previously largest
firm, but profitable for the outsiders. In traditional analyses, mergers without
efficiency gains are unprofitable for the insiders unless large parts of the industry
are involved in case of strategic substitutes (Salant et al., 1983), and to the benefit
of all firms in case of strategic complements (Deneckere and Davidson, 1985).
Different from these contributions, in our model with strategic complements,
mergers may or may not be profitable depending on the capacity of the involved
firms. However, as in the traditional models, we find that outsiders always profit
from mergers in the industry.
The model in the fourth chapter entitled “The scope for collusion under
different pricing schemes” is joint work with Alexander Rasch. In this model, we
analyze the impact of different pricing schemes on firms’ ability to collude. The
question of how different pricing schemes or tariffs affect customer welfare has
come to the attention of competition authorities and regulators in recent years
for two main reasons. First, collusive agreements on a global scale involving
almost all major airlines have been revealed in the air cargo industry where
prices consist of multiple fixed and variable components.3 In 2008, major airlines
agreed to plead guilty and pay fines exceeding $500 million for fixing one or
more components of total air cargo rates in the US alone (U.S. Department of
Justice, 2008).4 Second, it is an ongoing discussion of whether the simplification
of tariff structures benefits customers. For example, the British Office of Gas
and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) recently prohibited complex tariffs in the
3In this market, shipping or freight rates can be considered flat fees within a certain weight
segment and/or type of commodity. Different from that, (per-kilo and/or per-km) surcharges
typically depend on the exact chargeable weight and/or distance and can be considered linear.
4Involved airlines include Air Canada, Air France-KLM, British Airways, Cathay Pacific,
Cargolux, Emirates, Japan Airlines, LAN Chile, Lufthansa, Martinair, SAS Cargo Group, Singa-
pore Airlines, and Qantas Airways. Other jurisdictions where cartel members fined include the
European Union (European Commission, 2010), Canada (Canadian Competition Bureau, 2013),
Switzerland (Swiss Competition Commission, 2014), and New Zealand (Commerce Commission
New Zealand, 2013).
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markets for electricity and gas in the UK in order to enhance transparency and the
comparability of prices to the benefit of consumers (Office of Gas and Electricity
Markets, 2014).
We analyze the incentives to collude under different pricing schemes in a
differentiated-products setting à la Hotelling (1929) with elastic demand. Total
demand is elastic as local demand—the demand of a single customer—decreases
in price and in the distance to the respective firm (i.e., transport cost). The three
different pricing schemes we compare are (i) a linear per-unit price, (ii) a fixed
fee independent of the quantity purchased, and (iii) a (nonlinear) two-part tariff
consisting of a fixed (entry) fee and a linear per-unit price. We find that allowing
firms to set two-part tariffs as opposed to linear prices facilitates collusion at
maximum prices independent of the degree of product differentiation. However,
compared to a situation where firms can only set fixed fees, collusion at maximum
prices is less sustainable with two-part tariffs.
Collusion is more attractive under nonlinear pricing compared to linear pricing
because of a relatively large profit from deviation under linear pricing. When a
firm deviates in the linear-pricing scenario to increase market share, lowering its
price has an additional positive effect on profits because it increases local demand.
This effect is absent under nonlinear pricing which leads to a strong decrease of
deviation profits as differentiation increases. Collusion is easiest to sustain in
the fixed-fee scenario. This is also caused by relatively lower deviation profits
under fixed fees relative to two-part tariffs. Under two-part tariffs, the deviating
firm is able to fine-tune local demand using the linear part of the tariff especially
when differentiation is large and optimal deviation does not entail covering the
whole market, giving rise to larger profits from deviation and a lower incentive to
collude.
When interpreting two-part tariffs as complex and fixed fees and linear prices
as simplified tariffs, our model predicts an increase in customer surplus in a static,
competitive environment when complex tariffs are prohibited. When considering
the incentives to collude, however, the effects of simplification on customer
surplus are unclear, suggesting the necessity of a careful approach to simplifying
tariff structures. Allowing firms to charge simpler flat fees harms customers as it
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fosters collusion while the incentives to collude are reduced when firms can only
set linear prices instead of two-part tariffs.
CHAPTER 2
SEARCHING FOR EVIDENCE: LESS CAN BE MORE
Abstract
We analyze a situation where an uninformed decision-maker has to
decide on an issue. There are two parties with state-independent opposing
interests who can acquire information in support of their cause through
costly search. Information can be obtained across multiple dimensions. A
decision is more complex the more dimensions are available for investiga-
tion. Each party has to decide on the number of searches it performs. If
there is an asymmetry between the parties with regard to the utility they
derive from decisions in their favor, we show that a reduction of complex-
ity can lead to an overall increased and more balanced search which may
improve welfare.
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Regulation and antitrust has become more complex. For example, in financial
regulation in the United States, the Dodd-Frank Act which was signed into law
in 2010 is “23 times longer than Glass-Steagall” (The Economist, 2012), the
legislation passed in the 1930s as a response to the 1929 crash of Wall Street.
In the European Union, the European Commission (EC) observes increased
complexity in merger cases. The EC states: “The recent trend that transactions
become more complex has continued in 2013. Second phase investigations in
particular generally require sophisticated quantitative and qualitative analyses
involving large amounts of data.” (European Commission, 2014, p. 25).
Complexity itself may not be problematic, but it becomes an issue if the
firms and government agencies involved in regulation and antitrust cases cannot
adjust to it in a similar fashion. While firms can presumably more easily increase
their budget for legal and/or economic advice if deemed necessary, government
agencies face binding budget constraints and may be unable to increase their
8
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workforce or keep enough competent staff on their payroll. This asymmetry may
lead to biased decisions and welfare losses, or, as Rogoff (2012) puts it for the
case of financial regulation: “The problem, at least, is simple: As finance has
become more complicated, regulators have tried to keep up by adopting ever
more complicated rules. It is an arms race that underfunded government agencies
have no chance to win.”
In a setting where a decision-maker has to decide on an issue but is uninformed
and has to rely on two biased parties that may search for multiple pieces of
information and submit it to her, we find that reducing complexity may increase
search activity and welfare if the two parties are asymmetric in the utility they
derive from a favorable decision.
We assume that the two parties derive positive utility only if the decision is
made in their favor. Applied to our initial example, one party may be interpreted
as a firm filing for a merger with one of its competitors while the other party is the
antitrust authority attempting to prevent a potential reduction of consumer surplus
due to the merger. In this situation, we argue that it is natural to assume that both
parties benefit from a favorable decision only and that the (monetary) benefit
of a cleared merger to the involved firm(s) by far outweighs the (potentially
non-monetary) benefit of the (bureaucrats of the) antitrust authority in case of a
blocked merger.
Both parties can simultaneously search for information on multiple dimen-
sions. We interpret the number of dimensions as the complexity of a case. If
the utility of the disadvantaged party is too low to engage in any search for
information initially, we show in a first step that a reduction of complexity, that is,
a reduction of the number of dimensions available for investigation, may increase
search incentives of this party holding constant full search by the other party.
The reduction of complexity reduces the advantage of the privileged party which
makes search more attractive to the disadvantaged party.
The decision-maker aims to maximize welfare but is neither informed about
the state nor is she able to observe the search activity by the two parties. In
a first-best world, the decision-maker is fully informed and does not generate
welfare losses by wrong decisions. This could be reached in equilibrium if both
parties search on all dimensions. In an equilibrium where one of the parties does
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not search on all dimensions, however, the decision-maker is not fully informed
and cannot avoid decision errors. A reduction of complexity has in principle two
effects: it makes it impossible to reach the first-best but it can at the same time
lead to increased search activity by the disadvantaged party which translates into
more and more balanced information available to the decision-maker. For an
initially large enough number of dimensions, we show that this can lead to an
increase of welfare.
Our results suggest that it may be beneficial for welfare to simplify proce-
dures in competition and regulation cases if the involved agents are asymmetric.
This finding is consistent with the Regulatory Fitness and Performance program
(REFIT) initiated by the EU which, regarding merger review, aims “to make the
EU merger review procedures simpler and lighter for stakeholders and to save
costs.” (European Commission, 2014, p. 24)
The decision-maker in our model could correspond to a judge deciding on
an antitrust or regulation case in the US or to a judge presiding over a white-
collar-crime case. In the EU, the EC has the hybrid role of a biased party and the
decision-maker. On the one hand, its goal is to protect consumer interests, on the
other hand, it decides on whether to allow or block a merger. Because ‘wrong’
decisions can be reviewed and overturned by the European Court of Justice, we
argue that our setting also applies to the European case.1
Another prominent application of our model is informational lobbying with
competing interest groups. Policy-makers who have to decide on whether to
vote in favor of or against new legislation are potentially uninformed about the
implications of the new legislation but can rely on lobby groups to feed them
with (possibly biased) information. Lobby groups benefit from a policy change
in their favor and can invest resources to search for arguments and information
supporting their preferred outcome. If such information is discovered, the group
has an incentive to inform the policy-maker about it. Examples where the benefit
of a favorable decision may differ significantly between interest groups include
tobacco companies competing with consumer protection groups in order to avoid
sales and/or marketing restrictions or oil companies lobbying for drilling rights
or the legalization of fracking against environmental protection interest groups.
1For a confirmation of this view from a law perspective, see Vesterdorf (2005).
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Our model is related to the literature on lobbying2. There are two differ-
ent channels through which interest groups can influence the political decision
process: campaign contributions and informational lobbying.3 Interest groups
can either supply politicians with information pertinent to the policy decision
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Austen-Smith and Wright, 1992; Potters and van
Winden, 1992) or donate money to swing policy in their favor or help the preferred
candidate to get elected (Prat, 2002a,b; Coate, 2004a,b), or both (Bennedsen and
Feldmann, 2006; Dahm and Porteiro, 2008; Cotton, 2012). It is argued that
informational lobbying is more prevalent, especially in the EU (Chalmers, 2013;
New York Times, 2013), and more important compared to contributions (Potters
and van Winden, 1992; Bennedsen and Feldmann, 2002). Generally, the litera-
ture on informational lobbying shows that decision-makers can learn something
about the state of the world even from biased experts and improve policy by
taking their information into account.4 We show in our paper that with asym-
metric lobby groups and multiple searches, the decision-maker may only receive
information from the stronger group and welfare-reducing decision errors can
occur. Simplifying the decision process by restricting the number of dimensions
where information is taken into account for the decision results in more balanced
information provision and increased welfare. A similar result has been found in
the literature on contribution limits. Exertion of political influence by means of
contributions is seen critical by the general public which fears that wealthy groups
can simply buy political favors (Prat, 2002b). In response, many countries use
some form of contribution limits or try to reform campaign finance. Cotton (2012)
analyzes a situation where a rich and a poor lobby group can pay contributions
in order to get access to a decision-maker which is assumed to be essential for
the transmission of information. In his model, limits can be beneficial and yield
2There is also a large political science literature on this topic, an overview is given by Woll
(2006).
3For an overview, see Grossman and Helpman (2001).
4Our model is also related to the more general literature on strategic information transmission
started by Crawford and Sobel (1982). In these models, an uninformed decision maker (receiver)
makes a decision based on information presented by one or more informed expert(s) (sender).
The messages in these games typically are cheap talk while in our model, messages are verifiable,
and senders can only send hard information they have gathered at a cost beforehand. A more
recent overview of this literature is provided by Sobel (2013).
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more information transmission and better policy when interest groups can decide
whether to form a lobby or not. Our model is complementary to that literature in
that it shows that welfare can be improved by simplifying the decision process
when two asymmetric interest groups compete.
In our model, the interest groups are only interested in finding evidence
in favor of their cause and hence are advocates in the sense of Dewatripont
and Tirole (1999) who have shown that when agents receive decision-based
rewards, competition between opposed agents can increase information gathering
or render it cheaper for the principal (see also Austen-Smith and Wright, 1992).
Qualitatively, our information structure can be interpreted as an extension of the
information structure of Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) to multiple dimensions.
Similarly, Krishna and Morgan (2001) show that a decision-maker benefits from
consulting two experts, but only when the experts’ preferences are opposed.
Bennedsen and Feldmann (2006) look at the interplay of informational lobbying
and contributions and find that if contributions are available, less information
is transmitted in equilibrium and competition between the groups cannot fully
alleviate this result because search creates an information externality if it is
unsuccessful which benefits the weaker group and thus decreases the incentives
to search by the stronger group.
The positive effect of reducing the action space of the agents has also been
shown in the literature on optimal delegation (e.g. Szalay, 2005; Alonso and
Matouschek, 2008; Armstrong and Vickers, 2010). In these models, a principal
delegates decision making authority to a self-interested agent. The principal has
to decide how much liberty he wants to give to the agent. For example, in a
model of interval delegation, Szalay (2005) shows that removing intermediate
decisions from the agent’s action set can improve his incentives for information
gathering. In our model, the quality of decisions can be improved by restricting
the information space through deliberate exclusion of one of the dimensions.5
5In the context of merger control, Dertwinkel-Kalt and Wey (2014) show that introducing
remedies as an intermediate option can reduce the search incentives of the competition authority
in a setting based on Szalay (2005).
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Finally, our model is related to the contest literature.6 Che and Gale (1998)
show in an all-pay auction with asymmetric bidders that restricting the bid space
by introducing a cap can increase competition and overall bids. Because the cap
can also lower the winning probability of the high value bidder, welfare may
decrease. One difference to our setting is the definition of welfare. In Che and
Gale (1998), welfare is maximized if the bidder with the largest valuation wins
the auction while in our model, welfare is maximized if the decision is made in
favor of the party with more positive information, which is unrelated to valuation.
Thus, for welfare maximization, both parties are ex-ante equally likely to win.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we present
the model. The analysis of the game in Section 2.3 starts in Subsection 2.3.1 with
the case where search is unrestricted and proceeds with the case where search
on one dimension is prohibited in Subsection 2.3.2. We then compare the search
activity and the effects on welfare of the reduction in the number of dimensions
in Subsection 2.3.3. A discussion follows in Section 2.4, and we conclude and
provide an outlook in Section 2.5.
2.2 THE MODEL
A judge (she) has to make a decision on a case based on information available
on multiple dimensions. The information is collected by two interested parties,
the firm and the regulator. Information on all dimensions is weighted equally for
the decision. More specifically, the judge can either accept or reject a proposal
brought forward by the firm, denoted by d f and dr, respectively. The firm prefers
decision d f , while the regulator prefers dr. The information on each dimension
i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n} consists of the realization of two i.i.d. random variables θi, j,
j ∈ { f ,r}. Each θi, j takes value 1 with probability p and value 0 with probability
1− p where 0 < p < 1. θi, f = 1 can be interpreted as information in favor of the
proposal while θi,r = 1 can be interpreted as information against the proposal
6In this literature, players exert effort which translates into a probability of winning the
contest through the contest success function. It is a standard observation in this literature that a
player’s contest success function is at least weakly increasing in effort. In contrast, in our model
the probability of winning may decrease in search activity due to the belief of the decision maker.
For a recent overview of the contest literature, see Konrad (2009).
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in dimension i. θi, j = 0, j ∈ { f ,r} means that there is no information available
either in favor or against the proposal in dimension i. The state of the world is
defined as Θ= {∑iθi, f ,∑iθi,r}.
The two parties receive benefit w j ≥ 0 in case d = d j and zero otherwise.7
Both parties maximize expected profits u(w j,d,c) = Pr(d = d j|E f ,Er)w j−E jc
where c > 0 are the marginal search costs and E j, j ∈ { f ,r} is the number of
searches by each party. To account for asymmetry between the two parties, we
assume w f > wr. Furthermore we assume that the benefit accruing to the firm if
the proposal is accepted is large enough such that full information collection on
all dimensions always overcompensates the cost of doing so.8
The judge’s aim is to maximize expected welfare based on the information
available to her.9 The welfare of a decision is given by ∑iθi, f −∑iθi,r if the
proposal is accepted and ∑iθi,r−∑iθi, f if the proposal is rejected.10
Thus, in case of full information, if there is (weakly) more information in
favor of the proposal, i.e., ∑iθi, f ≥∑iθi,r, it is optimal to accept the proposal and
reject it otherwise. Observe that in case of a tie, the proposal is accepted.11
In the situation we analyze there is incomplete information such that the state
of the world is ex ante unknown. Without any information, the expected value of
pro and contra information is the same in all dimensions and the judge accepts the
proposal. In this situation, that decision reduces welfare whenever∑iθi,r >∑iθi, f .
Hence, the judge is interested in gathering information. She cannot search for
information herself but has to rely on information made available to her by the
7The subscript j is dropped later in the analysis whenever it is clear to which party w refers.
8It is easy to verify that there are values of w f and c such that the firm wants to search n times
as long as Pr(d = d f |E f ,Er)w f is increasing in E f , which holds as long as the judge believes that
the firm conducts a full search on all dimensions.
9We assume that the decision-maker has no leeway and has to take the ex post optimal decision
given the evidence presented to her. We believe that a judge or the legislature politically cannot
implement a decision rule that is not welfare-optimal (for a similar argument, see Bennedsen and
Feldmann, 2006).
10Our definition of welfare follows from the assumption that the benefits w j as well as the
search costs c are insignificant relative to the positive (negative) welfare effect of a decision in
favor of the party for which more (less) supportive information exists and hence omit them from
our welfare definition. A similar welfare function is used in Cotton (2012) when abstaining from
the possibility of monetary contributions to the decision maker he analyzes.
11We argue that in case of a tie, there is no conclusive evidence against the proposal and thus,
there is no obvious reason to decide against it. Our results do not change qualitatively if we use a
tie breaking rule where the judge rejects the proposal or where she flips a fair coin.
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firm and the regulator. At the beginning of the game, the judge chooses the
number of dimensions which are relevant for the decision. The firm is interested
in searching information in favor of the proposal only, i.e., θi, f . The regulator
only searches for information against the proposal θi,r. Both firm and regulator
simultaneously search in each dimension at cost c. If a party searches in a given
dimension i and there exists evidence in this dimension, it learns θi, j with certainty.
If a party does not search, it learns nothing, which we denote by 0. Hence, finding
no information and not searching for information yield the same result.
After searching, both parties send a message m j ∈ {∑k θk, j,0} to the judge,
where k denotes the number of dimensions where the respective party searched
for information. We assume that parties cannot withhold information. This is
natural in our case as parties only search for information that is beneficial to them
and hence have no interest in holding it back.12 The message either consists of
the number of pieces of evidence that were found or 0. The information available
to the judge therefore is M = {m f ,mr}, which we also call outcome.
The judge holds two types of beliefs. First, the judge has an expectation
µ j ∈ {0,1,2, . . . ,n} about the number of searches of each party.13,14 Second,
she has a belief about the state of the world. Updating this belief not only
depends on the messages received by the two parties but also on the expectation
about the number of searches. Two cases are of particular interest to us. The
first interesting case is a situation in which the judge expects the regulator not
to search (µr = 0) and receives mr = 0, she learns nothing about the evidence
against the proposal. The second case of interest is when the judge expects a full
12The only exception is the case where the judge believes that the regulator does not search.
If the regulator does search and finds, say, one piece of information, he may prefer to withhold
it. This hinges on the out-of-equilibrium belief of the judge. We argue that while the ability to
withhold information does increase the incentives to search for the regulator in this case, it does
not qualitatively change our results.
13Technically, the belief of the judge is a probability distribution over the number of searches
of each party, that is, a vector including n+1 probabilities Pr(E j = X) that party j’s number of
searches equals X ∈ {0,1,2, . . . ,n}. In pure-strategy equilibria, the judge expects the parties to
search a specific number of times such that one probability equals 1 and all other probabilities
equal zero.
14In what follows, we assume the judge’s expectation about the number of searches by the
firm µ f to be equal to the number of admissible dimensions.
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search by the regulator on all dimensions, i.e. µr = n. The sequence of events is




















Figure 2.1: Sequence of events
2.3 ANALYSIS
We derive perfect Bayesian equilibria. An equilibrium consists of the number
of searches by firm and regulator, the decision rule by the judge, and her beliefs
µ f and µr about the number of searches performed by the firm and regulator,
respectively. In what follows, we fix the number of dimensions n = 3. We first
analyze Situation 1, where searching in all three dimensions is allowed (the case
of full complexity), and Situation 2, where the judge only accepts evidence from
two of the three dimensions (reduced complexity).15 All proofs are relegated to
the Appendix.
2.3.1 SITUATION 1: INFORMATION IS ACCEPTED FROM ALL
DIMENSIONS
Decision rules
We proceed backwards and first discuss the judge’s decision rule for a given
set of messages, M. The judge makes her decision based on the information
submitted to her by the parties and her beliefs on the number of searches of firm
15Our analysis is only meaningful if the judge has access to information submitted to her
by the parties only, ruling out the possibility that the judge might receive information from the
prohibited dimension through other means. Given the confidential nature of most arguments in
competition and regulation cases, publication or distribution via media outlets does not appear
to be in the interest of the involved parties. This assumption is also common in the lobbying
literature on access to legislators where information can only be submitted conditional on being
granted access (see, for example, Austen-Smith (1998); Cotton (2009, 2012) and the references
therein).
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and regulator in order to maximize expected welfare. Given our assumption
that the firm always searches on all available dimensions, two situations are of
particular interest for us: the case where the judge believes that the regulator
also searches on all available dimensions as a benchmark and the case where the
judge believes that the regulator does not search at all. If the belief concerning
the number of searches of party j is µ j = 3, the information submitted by j is
believed to be the state with probability 1. As a consequence, if the submitted
information is, say, m j = 1 then ∑iθi, j = 1, i.e. the judge believes that (only) one
piece of information in favor of j exists.
If the judge believes that both firm and regulator search three times (µ f =
µr = 3), the information available in equilibrium is equal to the state and she
decides as in the case with full information according to the first-best decision
rule: The decision is made in favor of the firm if it has found (weakly) more
information than regulator and in favor of the regulator if it has found (strictly)
more information. The optimal decision for all combinations of information for
beliefs µ f = µr = 3 is shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Decision rule for µ f = 3, µr = 3
Firm
{0, ·} {1, ·} {2, ·} {3, ·}
Regulator
{· ,0} F F F F
{· ,1} R F F F
{· ,2} R R F F
{· ,3} R R R F
If the judge believes the regulator did not search (µr = 0), there are only four
possible equilibrium outcomes M after the firm has searched for information:
{0,0}, {1,0}, {2,0}, and {3,0}. If the regulator does not search, the judge cannot
learn anything about the state and has to base her decision on the expected value of
information existing in favor of the regulator. The expected value of information
against the proposal is given by 3× p3+2×3(p2(1− p))+1×3p(1− p)2 = 3p.
The optimal decision is determined by comparing the information submitted by
the firm (which is equal to the state in equilibrium) with the expected value of
information of the regulator.
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Clearly, the proposal is rejected (accepted) if the firm finds no evidence
(evidence on all dimensions). The optimal decision rule for the two intermediate
cases depends on p. If the firm finds one piece of evidence and the proposal is
accepted, expected welfare is given by 1−3p which is positive only for p < 1/3
and hence the judge will reject the proposal for values of p larger than 1/3.
Similarly, if the firm finds two pieces of evidence, expected welfare is given by
2−3p.
We assume that if the judge receives a message other than 0 from the regulator
when expecting him not to search, then she updates her (out-of-equilibrium) belief
concerning the number of searches of the regulator to µr = 3.16 She updates her
belief regarding the state such that the probability that it is equal to the message
is equal to 1. It follows that the decision rule under full information applies out
of equilibrium. The complete decision rule is given in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Decision rule for µ f = 3, µr = 0
Firm
{0, ·} {1, ·} {2, ·} {3, ·}
Regulator
{· , 0}
p ∈ (0,1/3] R F F F
p ∈ (1/3,2/3] R R F F
p ∈ (2/3,1) R R R F
{· , 1} R F F F
{· , 2} R R F F
{· , 3} R R R F
Incentives to search
We first analyze the equilibrium candidate where the judge has the belief µr = 3
(and, as we assume throughout, µ f = 3). The regulator anticipates the decision
by the judge dependent on the information submitted to her. This gives rise to
the following probabilities Pr(dr|Er) of a decision against the proposal when he
16Because Bayes’ rule does not apply in situations that occur with probability zero, there is no
constraint on the out-of-equilibrium beliefs we specify. We choose the out-of-equilibrium belief
that is least favorable for the regulator.
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performs Er ∈ {0,1,2,3} searches:17
Pr(dr|0) = 0
Pr(dr|1) = (1− p)3 p
Pr(dr|2) = (1− p)3(2p(1− p)+ p2)+3p(1− p)2 p2
Pr(dr|3) = (1− p)3(1− (1− p)3)+3p(1− p)2(3p2(1− p)+ p3)+3p2(1− p)p3.
For example, if the regulator searches one time, the decision is made in his
favor if the firm does not find any information, which occurs with probability
(1− p)3, and if he finds one piece of information, which occurs with probability
p. It is optimal for the regulator to search three times if the expected profit of
searching three times is larger than the expected profit of searching twice (2.3.1),
of searching once (2.3.2), and of not searching (2.3.3).
Pr(dr|3)w−3c≥ Pr(dr|2)w−2c (2.3.1)
Pr(dr|3)w−3c≥ Pr(dr|1)w− c (2.3.2)
Pr(dr|3)w−3c≥ Pr(dr|0)w (2.3.3)
The following lemma gives a condition for the benefit of the regulator, w, under
which these constraints hold such that the regulator matches the search effort by
the firm.





p−5p2+16p3−28p4+26p5−10p6) for 0 < p≤ p˜
c/
(
p−4p2+ 283 p3−13p4+10p5− 103 p6
)
for p˜ < p≤ 1,
there exists an equilibrium in which the regulator and the firm search three times
and the judge has beliefs µ f = µr = 3.
The lemma defines a lower bound on the benefit w as a function of p above
which a full search by both parties constitutes an equilibrium. The binding
incentive constraint is determined by the smallest increase in the probability of
17As E f = 3 we omit the reference to the number of the searches by the firm.
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a decision in favor of the regulator per unit of search cost when searching three
times instead of two times, once or not all.
When p tends to zero, the probability of winning tends to zero regardless of
the number of searches. Because searching is costly, it can never be implemented.
For low values of p, the marginal cost-adjusted increase in the probability of
winning is smallest when moving from two to three searches and IC (2.3.1) is
binding. The probability of a favorable decision is maximal for intermediate
values of p, resulting in the lowest benefit necessary to implement full search. As
p grows large, the probability of winning tends to zero because it becomes more
likely that the firm finds three pieces of information. The binding IC becomes
(2.3.3) because in this range of p, the marginal probability of winning is convex
for the regulator and hence the average increase when moving from no search to a
full search is smaller than the increase from one or two searches to three searches.







Figure 2.2: Lower bound for full-search equilibrium with c = 1/10. The grey
area indicates the region where the full-search equilibrium exists.
As a next step, we show that an equilibrium where the regulator does not
search also exists. If the judge has the belief µr = 0, it is optimal for the regulator
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not to search if
Pr(dr|0)w≥ Pr(dr|3)w−3c (2.3.4)
Pr(dr|0)w≥ Pr(dr|2)w−2c (2.3.5)
Pr(dr|0)w≥ Pr(dr|1)w− c. (2.3.6)
Clearly, these constraints can be satisfied by setting w = 0. The following lemma
defines a threshold on w below which the regulator will not search for information.






3p3−8p4+8p5−3p6) for 0 < p≤ 13
∞ for 13 < p≤ pˆ
−3c/(9p2−36p3+54p4−39p5+12p6) for pˆ < p≤ 23
∞ for 23 < p≤ 1,
there exists an equilibrium where the regulator does not search, the firm searches
in all three dimensions, and the judge has beliefs µ f = 3 and µr = 0.
Because the judge takes into account the information in favor of the regulator
that may exist but is never discovered in equilibrium, searching only one or two
times becomes increasingly unattractive for the regulator as p increases. Techni-
cally, the probability of winning decreases when searching once or twice instead
of not searching. Additionally, searching is costly. Positive wages inducing a full
search by the regulator exist only in regions of p just to the left of a change in
the decision rule. The area in which not searching is an equilibrium is colored in
grey in Figure 2.3.
As we are interested in a situation where three searches by the regulator cannot
be implemented, we next show that an equilibrium in which the regulator does
not search exists for benefits below w, i.e. the lowest possible benefit inducing
three searches by the regulator, by comparing the two critical values w and wˆ.
Lemma 3. It holds that wˆ≥ w.







Figure 2.3: Upper bound for no-search equilibrium with c = 1/10. The grey area
indicates the region where the no-search equilibrium exists.
The lemma establishes that the no-search equilibrium exists for benefits below
the minimum benefit necessary to implement full search. When the judge holds
the belief that the regulator does not search, searching is relatively unattractive
for the regulator because the judge takes into account the information that may
exist but remains undiscovered. When the judge believes the regulator performs
a full search, she will not decide in favor of the regulator if he does not deliver
information, increasing the intrinsic motivation to search. A graphical comparison
of the two critical values w and wˆ is given in Figure 2.4.
To complete the analysis of pure-strategy equilibria under full complexity,
we note that equilibria where the regulator searches one or two times also exist
for benefits below w. A full characterization of these equilibria can be found in
Appendix 2.6.2. In Lemma 4 we define constraints on w (and p) such that no
search by the regulator is the unique equilibrium in pure strategies in Situation 1.








Figure 2.4: Comparison of thresholds for no-search and full-search equilibrium
with c = 1/10. The grey area indicates the region where the full-search equilib-
rium does not exist while the no-search equilibrium exists.
Lemma 4. There exist critical values w2 and p¨ such that if and only if either (a)
w < w˜ or (b) w2 < w < w and 1/2 < p < p¨, no search by the regulator is the
unique equilibrium given three searches by the firm.
If the judge accepts evidence from all three available dimensions and if the
benefit w for the regulator is restricted, search activity is one-sided: the firm
gathers evidence on all dimensions whereas the regulator does not search. The
judge then only learns the arguments in favor of the firm but is not informed about
arguments in favor of the regulator.
2.3.2 SITUATION 2: RESTRICTED SCOPE OF INFORMATION
In this section, we analyze the situation where the scope of information is re-
stricted in the sense that the judge accepts information from two dimensions only.
We characterize an equilibrium in which both parties search in all allowed dimen-
2. SEARCHING FOR EVIDENCE: LESS CAN BE MORE 24
sions. The probability that information exists in the third (unavailable) dimension
is equal for both parties (and cases) and thus not relevant for the decision.
As in the case of full complexity, if the judge believes that both firm and
regulator conduct a full search (µ f = µr = 2) she takes the reported information
to be equal to the true values and accepts the proposal if the firm has found
(weakly) more information and rejects it otherwise. The decision rule by the
judge is displayed in Table 2.3.
Firm
{0, ·} {1, ·} {2, ·}
Regulator
{· ,0} F F F
{· ,1} R F F
{· ,2} R R F
Table 2.3: Decision rule for µ f = 2, µr = 2
The regulator has an incentive to search twice if
Pr(dr|2)w−2c≥ Pr(dr|1)w− c (2.3.7)
Pr(dr|2)w−2c≥ Pr(dr|0)w. (2.3.8)
The following lemma defines a range for the benefit w of the regulator in which
an equilibrium where both regulator and firm search two times exists.





p−3p2+5p3−3p4) for 0 < p < 1/3
c/
(
p− 52 p2+3p3− 32 p4
)
for 1/3≤ p < 1,
there exists an equilibrium in which the regulator and the firm search on all two
admissible dimensions and the judge has beliefs µ f = µr = 2.
The shape of the lower bound on w defined in the lemma is qualitatively
similar to w given in Lemma 1. As p tends to zero or one, the probability of
winning tends to zero and a full search cannot be implemented. For small values
of p the marginal increase in the probability of winning per unit of search cost is
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smallest for the second search while for large values of p, incentivizing full search
as opposed to not searching at all leads to the lowest cost-weighted increase in the







Figure 2.5: Lower bound for full-search equilibrium under reduced complex-
ity with c = 1/10. The grey area indicates the region where the full-search
equilibrium exists.
2.3.3 COMPARISON OF SITUATIONS 1 AND 2
Search activity
After solving the game separately in Situation 1, where search is unrestricted, and
in Situation 2, where evidence on one dimension is not accepted by the judge,
we now combine and summarize our previous results regarding the regulator’s
search activity in the following proposition. To set the stage for our first main
result, we start by comparing the minimum wages necessary to implement the
full-search equilibrium in both situations.
Proposition 1. The minimum benefit w necessary to render three efforts opti-
mal for the regulator when three dimensions are allowed is always larger than
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the minimum benefit w necessary to make two efforts optimal when only two
dimensions are allowed.
The proposition says that a range of benefits w exists where a full search by
the regulator cannot be implemented when search is unrestricted, while a full
search is an equilibrium when the scope of search is restricted to two dimensions.
In particular, in connection with Lemma 3, which states that not searching is
an equilibrium for benefits below w, if w < w < w, i.e. if full search cannot
be implemented when all dimensions are available, reducing complexity can
increase the regulator’s search activity. The range of benefits where full search is









Figure 2.6: Comparison of lower bounds for full-search equilibria under full and
reduced complexity with c = 1/10. The grey area indicates the region where the
full-search equilibrium exists under reduced complexity but does not exist under
full complexity.
Reducing the number of available dimensions increases the change in the
probability of winning per unit of search costs in the binding incentive constraints,
therefore decreasing the lowest benefit necessary to implement full search. If it is
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unlikely that information exists (small p), in both situations the binding constraint
is given by comparing the expected profit from full search with the expected
profit of one less search. With reduced complexity, the cost-weighted increase in
the winning probability is larger because the second search is more likely to be
decisive. For large probabilities that information exists, the relevant comparison
is between full search and no search. The increase in the probability of a decision
in favor of the regulator when moving from no search to full search is larger
under full complexity than under reduced complexity. When taking into account
the cost of searching, however, reducing complexity leads to an increase in the
probability of winning per unit of search costs. For both constraints, the necessary
benefit to induce full search by the regulator is therefore smaller compared to the
case of full complexity.
Taken together, if the benefit of the regulator is bounded from above, par-
ticularly if the benefits are below w, he will not search if the scope of search is
unrestricted. Prohibiting to search for information on one of the three dimensions
lowers the benefit that is necessary to make the regulator willing to search on all
available dimensions. This levels the playing field such that the regulator is able
to search on as many dimensions as the firm.
If w < w there are two other equilibria in Situation 1 where the regulator
searches once and twice, respectively. The following proposition shows that
further restrictions on w and p lead to an unambiguously one-sided search ac-
tivity: Under the conditions specified in the following proposition, if search is
unrestricted, the regulator will never search while he will conduct a full search if
complexity is reduced.
Proposition 2. There exist critical values w2 and p¨ such that if and only if either
(a) w ≤ w < w˜ and 0 < p < 1/3 or (b) max{w2,w} < w < w and 1/2 < p < p¨,
the regulator searches in two dimensions if the scope of search is limited to
two dimensions while he does not search if searching on all three dimension is
allowed.
Next we show that besides potentially increasing the regulator’s search ac-
tivity, a reduction of the number of admissible dimensions can also be welfare-
enhancing.
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Welfare
We now determine the expected welfare losses Lk, where k ∈ {1,2} refers to
Situation 1 or 2, due to decision errors under incomplete information. These
errors occur when the decision made by the judge given M does not match the
optimal decision givenΘ. For example, if the judge believes that the firm conducts
a full search while the regulator does not search in situation 1 (µ f = 3, µr = 0)
and receives the message M = {1,0}, he decides in favor of the firm if p≤ 1/3.
In this scenario, a loss of 3−1 = 2 occurs if the state is Θ= {1,3}.
In Situation 1, where we focus on the equilibrium where the regulator does
not search, welfare losses can occur in the two intermediate outcomes, that is, if
the firm has found evidence in one or two dimensions (M = {1,0} or M = {2,0}).
The cases in which welfare is reduced depend on the level of p as the judge’s
decision rule is different for different values of p. Each loss can be deconstructed
into the probability of an outcome where a loss can occur (which we call error-
prone messages) and the probability that a loss actually occurs.
For 0 < p < 1/3, a wrong decision is made by the judge when the firm has
found one piece of evidence but two or three pieces of evidence exist for the
regulator, or when the firm has found two pieces but there are three pieces of





= 3p(1− p)2× (3p2(1− p)(2−1)+ p3(3−1))
+3p2(1− p)× p3(3−2).
If 1/3 < p < 2/3, the judge decides in favor of the regulator if the the firm has
found one piece of evidence. This decision rule results in a welfare loss if there
exist no pieces of evidence for the regulator. A loss also occurs when the firm
has found two pieces and there exist three pieces of evidence on the side of the
regulator. In this case, the expected losses are
L1
∣∣∣
p∈( 13 , 23 ]
= 3p(1− p)2× (1− p)3(1−0)
+3p2(1− p)× p3(3−2).
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For 2/3 < p < 1, the decision is made in favor of the regulator when the firm has
found two pieces of evidence. In this case, wrong decisions are made again in
case of {1,0}, and when the firm has found two pieces but there exist zero or




= 3p(1− p)2× (1− p)3(1−0)
+3p2(1− p)× ((1− p)3(2−0)+3p(1− p)2(2−1)) .
Simplifying leads to a total expected welfare loss in Situation 1 of
L1 =

9p3−21p4+18p5−6p6 for 0 < p < 1/3
3p−15p2+30p3−30p4+18p5−6p6 for 1/3 < p < 2/3
3p−9p2+15p3−21p4+18p5−6p6 for 2/3 < p < 1.
In Situation 2, welfare losses can occur in all outcomes in which both parties
have found the same amount of evidence, that is, {0,0}, {1,1}, and {2,2}. In
these cases, it is possible that additional evidence in favor of the regulator but not
in favor of the firm exists in the additional dimension but is not discovered. The
expected losses in this situation are
L2 = (1− p)4× (1− p)p(1−0)
+4p2(1− p)2× (1− p)p(2−1)
+ p4× (1− p)p(3−2)
or
L2 = p−5p2+14p3−22p4+18p5−6p6.
A comparison of L1 and L2 gives the following result.
Proposition 3. Under the conditions of Proposition 2 and for 2−√3 < p <√
3−1, the reduction of the number of dimensions from three to two is welfare-
enhancing.
The proposition gives a condition under which it can be beneficial from a
welfare perspective to reduce the complexity of the case and deliberately ignore
evidence from one dimension when (i) one of the two parties who can search
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for information is disadvantaged in the sense that its benefit from the decision
is smaller than the other party’s, and (ii) the probability that evidence exists in a
given dimension and in a given direction is intermediate. A graphical comparison













Situation 1 Situation 2
Figure 2.7: Expected losses in Situation 1 (where search activity is asymmetric)
and Situation 2 (where search is symmetric but information from one dimension
is omitted).
For both small and large probabilities that information exists, the expected
losses are smaller in a situation of asymmetric search activity. For small values
of p, in Situation 1, error-prone messages are very unlikely to occur because they
require at least one piece of information. Conversely, in Situation 2, errors can
occur if neither party finds any information (M = {0,0}), which is very likely for
small p. Additionally, wrong decisions in Situation 1 occur if multiple pieces of
information exist in favor of the regulator, which is also improbable. Conversely,
in Situation 2 for errors to occur, only one additional piece of information is
necessary, i.e., when there is information against the proposal but not in favor of
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it in the omitted third dimension, which is relatively likely. A similar argument
can be made if the probability that information exists is large.
For intermediate probabilities that information exists, a situation of reduced
complexity and symmetric search leads to lower expected losses. Two opposing
effects are at work. On the one hand, the probability that an informational setting
occurs in which wrong decisions can be made is large in Situation 1 and small in
Situation 2, making losses more likely in the former situation; on the other hand
the probability that a wrong decision is actually made is small in Situation 1 and
large in Situation 2. We find that the first effect is stronger, resulting in larger
expected losses when search is unrestricted but asymmetric. It is in this range
of p where a reduction of complexity has an unambiguously welfare-enhancing
effect.
2.4 DISCUSSION
In the following section we examine the robustness of our results. In particular,
we discuss varying the number of initial dimensions as well as allowing the judge
to ex ante commit to a decision rule.
Number of dimensions
Our analysis is based on initially three dimensions. We argue that this is the
smallest number of dimensions where restricting search can increase welfare.
The main difference between the two situations is that if the regulator does not
search, the judge learns all arguments in favor of the proposal but none against
it, while if search is restricted, she learns all pro and contra arguments on all
but one dimensions. When there are two or less initial dimensions, knowing all
evidence in one direction is better from a welfare perspective than not knowing
any evidence from the excluded dimension. This is obvious if there is only one
dimension. If there are more dimensions, the judge adjusts the decision rule in
case of asymmetric search according to the expected value of information in the
undiscovered direction which dampens welfare losses. If search is symmetric but
restricted the expected value concerning the unavailable dimension is irrelevant
for the decision and thus losses cannot be avoided. For two initial dimensions,
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the first effect dominates and welfare cannot be improved by restricting search.18
As the number of dimensions increases, however, making the correct decision
without information from the regulator becomes more and more problematic as
the number of the intermediate outcomes where errors can occur and the size of
the errors increase. In contrast, the losses when being fully informed about all but
one dimensions decrease because the single omitted dimension’s impact on the
decision becomes increasingly smaller. Thus it appears intuitive that the effect
exists and may be even stronger for a larger number of dimensions.
So far we have assumed that the number of dimensions is exogenous. How-
ever, in actual cases, the firm has some leeway in determining the number of
dimensions, i.e., in choosing the degree of complexity. By hiring more lawyers
and/or consultants, the firm might be able to file a larger report to the authorities.
In this situation, the number of dimensions is determined endogenously. It is
then to be expected that the firm will choose this number taking into account
the incentives by the regulator to put effort into search. That is, the firm might
strategically choose the size of complexity in order to minimize the search effort
of the regulator. Then, again, reducing the number of dimensions from which
information is accepted may have a positive effect on the search activity of the
regulator. We leave the formal proof of these claims as open questions for future
research.
Ex ante commitment to a decision rule
We assume throughout that the judge makes the ex-post-optimal decision given the
information available to her. Alternatively, one could assume that the judge can
commit herself to a decision rule before firm and regulator search for information.
Two cases can be distinguished.
If the rational judge chooses to commit to the decision rule that maximizes
her objective function ex post, ex ante commitment can be interpreted as an
equilibrium selection device. The more interesting case arises if we assume that
the judge commits ex ante to a decision rule which possibly violates ex post
optimality. There is a considerable tension between inducing (optimal) search
18Reducing complexity also does not increase overall search activity and thus does not improve
welfare.
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activity and welfare losses. The judge can easily construct decision rules that
support a full search by the regulator as an equilibrium for a larger range of w than
discussed in the main text. As an example, consider a decision rule specifying a
decision in favor of the regulator if he finds one or more pieces of information
independent of the information submitted by the firm. It is straightforward to show
that the minimum benefit necessary to induce a full search in this case is lower
than w as specified in Lemma 1. However, there is a trade-off between enhancing
the incentives to search by an ex ante commitment and possibly reducing welfare.
In the current example, losses may be large because the judge commits to decide
in favor of the regulator even if he only finds one piece of information while the
firm finds three pieces. Deriving the optimal trade-off is beyond the scope of this
article and may be an interesting direction for future research.
2.5 CONCLUSION
In merger cases, information about the potential effects on consumer surplus
is essential for the decision-making of competition authorities. Similarly, in
lobbying cases, policy-makers need access to information in order to draft sensible
legislation. We analyze a model where a decision-maker has to decide on a
proposal based on information imparted to her by two interested parties, the firm
and the regulator. The firm prefers the proposal to be accepted while the regulator
benefits from a rejection. The firm (regulator) only searches for information in
favor (against) the proposal. Information is multidimensional in the sense that
there is information in favor and against the proposal in several dimensions. The
basis of our analysis is the assumption that the regulator receives a smaller benefit
from winning than the firm. This assumption captures that the regulator typically
consists of bureaucrats with fixed wages, while the firm employs consultants
and lawyers with incentive contracts to defend their case. We show that this
asymmetry between the two parties can lead to biased search activity where the
firm searches for more information than the regulator. In this case, the decision-
maker has to decide based on biased arguments a majority of which were obtained
from only one party. We suggest to reduce the complexity of the decision-making
process by reducing the number of dimensions that the decision maker takes into
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account. We show that this allows the disadvantaged regulator to catch up with
the firm’s search efforts. In turn, the decision-maker is provided with more and
more balanced information which results in a welfare increase if the probability
that information exists is neither too small nor too large.
At a first glance it is sensible to include as many relevant aspects as possible
in merger cases or when new legislation is drafted. However, this aim might not
be achievable when the parties who provide the decision-maker with information
are very asymmetric, for example when small citizens’ initiatives compete with
large energy companies lobbying for fracking rights, or when a competition
authority examines a proposed merger by companies with an unlimited budget
for legal advice. In such cases it can be beneficial to reduce the complexity of the
procedure in order to level the playing field. Our findings are in line with recent
efforts by the EU as part of the REFIT programme which, regarding merger
review, aims “to make the EU merger review procedures simpler and lighter for
stakeholders and to save costs.” (European Commission, 2014, p. 24)
More research on the topic of asymmetric parties and multidimensional
information is needed. A natural next step would be generalize the present model
to a setting including a variable number of initial dimensions. This makes it
possible to study the optimal reduction of complexity depending on the number
of initial dimensions and the degree of asymmetry. In a similar vein, allowing
the firm to strategically choose the number of relevant dimensions could lead to
interesting new results explaining the observation of asymmetric search effort.
2.6 APPENDIX
2.6.1 APPENDIX A: PROOFS
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respectively. The binding constraint is the stricter one, i.e., the one with the
smaller RHS. Constraint (2.6.1) is binding if the RHS of (2.6.2) minus the RHS
of (2.6.1) is positive, or 3− 20p+ 45p2− 48p3 + 20p4 ≥ 0. Define the LHS
as g(p). The third derivative g′′′(p) = −288+ 480p is increasing and crosses
the abscissa once from below. Hence, g′′(p) = 90− 288p+ 240p2 is convex
and has a local minimum at p = 288/480. As its value is positive at this local
minimum, it is positive throughout the range of p. This implies that g′(p) =
−20+90p−144p2+80p3 has a positive slope, and it crosses the abscissa once
from below as g′(0)< 0 and g′(1)> 0. Therefore, g(p) is convex and has a local
minimum, and because g(0)> 0 but g(1) = 0 and g′(1)> 0, its local minimum














Hence, for 0 < p < p˜, the condition above is satisfied and (2.3.1) is binding. For
p˜ < p < 1, (2.3.3) is the relevant constraint.









It suffices to show that the RHS of (2.6.3) is larger than the RHS (2.6.1), which
is equivalent to ga(p) := 1− 7p+ 18p2− 22p3 + 10p4 ≥ 0 for 0 < p ≤ p˜ and
larger than the RHS of (2.6.2) for p˜ < p < 1, which is equivalent to gb(p) :=
−3+19p−36p2+30p3−10p4 ≥ 0.
The third derivative g′′′a (p) =−132+240p is increasing and negative in the
relevant range as g′′′a (p˜) < 0. It follows that g′′a(p) = 36− 132p+ 120p2 has
a negative slope and is positive as g′′a(p˜) > 0. Therefore, g′a(p) = −7+ 36p−
66p2+40p3 is increasing and negative because g′a(p˜)< 0. The original function
ga(p) is decreasing but positive, as ga(p˜)> 0. Hence, the condition above holds
and (2.3.2) is slack for 0 < p < p˜.
For p˜ < p < 1, the third derivative g′′′b (p) = 180− 240p is decreasing and
crosses the abscissa once from above because g′′′b (p˜) > 0 and g
′′′
b (1) < 0. The
second derivative g′′b(p) =−72+180p−120p2 hence is concave and has a local
maximum at p = 3/4. As it is negative at its local maximum it is negative
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throughout the relevant range of p and therefore g′b(p) = 19−72p+90p2−40p3
has a negative slope. From g′b(p˜)> 0 and g
′
b(1)< 0 follows that it crosses the
abscissa once from above and that gb(p) is concave and has a local maximum in
the range of interest. As gb(p˜)> 0 and gb(1) = 0 (and g′b(1)< 0) we can infer
that it is positive in the range of interest, the condition above holds and (2.3.2) is
also slack for p˜ < p < 1.
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof is divided in three parts according to the three
ranges of p which differ in the decision rule—and hence in the probabilities of
winning Pr(dr|Er)—as outlined in Table 2.2.
For p≤ 1/3,
Pr(dr|0) = (1− p)3
Pr(dr|1) = (1− p)3
Pr(dr|2) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2 p2
Pr(dr|3) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2(3p2(1− p)+ p3)+3p2(1− p)p3.
Observe that (2.3.6) holds as long as c≥ 0, which is given by definition. Plugging












respectively. (2.3.4) is the binding constraint if the RHS of (2.6.4) is larger than
the RHS of (2.6.5), which is equivalent to 32 −5p+ 132 p2−3p3 > 0. Define the
LHS of this inequality as g(p) where g′(p) =−5+13p−9p2. g′(p) is strictly
concave and takes a global maximum of −11/36 at p = 13/18. Hence g(p) is
decreasing, and with g(0)> 0 and g(1) = 0 we have shown that the sign of g(p)
is nonnegative in the relevant range of p. The wage in that range of p hence is
given by (2.3.4), the incentive constraint preventing the regulator to conduct three
instead of zero searches.
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For 1/3 < p≤ 2/3,
Pr(dr|0) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2
Pr(dr|1) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2(1− p)
Pr(dr|2) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2((1− p)2+ p2)
Pr(dr|3) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2((1− p)3+3p2(1− p)+ p3)+3p2(1− p)p3.
We show that both incentive constraints (2.3.5) and (2.3.6) are always slack as
the probability difference on the LHS is positive for all values of p. Observe
that compared to zero searches, searching twice strictly reduces the winning
probability and the regulator has to incur effort costs of 2c. Searching twice
hence can never be optimal. The same holds for searching once, which also never
is optimal. It remains to be shown that (2.3.4) is slack for values of p below pˆ





Define as g(p)=−3+12p−18p2+13p3−4p4, which is the RHS of (2.6.6) with
p2 factored out. The value of g(0) is negative and the value of g(1) is zero, so there
can be at most three real roots in the range of p. We determine the actual number
of roots between 0 and 1 by analyzing the derivatives of g(p). g′′′(p) = 78−96p
is a linear decreasing function with a positive value at p = 0 and a negative value
at p= 1 and one root in between. Hence, g′′(p) =−36+78p−48p2 is a concave
function with one maximum in the relevant range. As g′′(p) is negative at the root
of g′′′(p), its maximum, the second derivative of g(p) is strictly negative in the
domain from 0 to 1. Therefore, the first derivative g′(p)= 12−36p+39p2−16p3
is decreasing in this range and has one root as g′(0) is positive and g′(1) is
negative. Finally, this implies that g(p) is concave and has a maximum in the














in that interval as the value of g(1) is zero. Taken together, the RHS of (2.6.6)
has roots at 0, pˆ, and 1, is negative for 0 < p < pˆ and positive for pˆ < p < 1.
2. SEARCHING FOR EVIDENCE: LESS CAN BE MORE 38
Since both c and w are positive, (2.6.6) is slack for 0 < p < pˆ and no positive
wage induces the regulator to search three times. For pˆ < p < 1, this constraint is
binding and yields the upper bound for the wage in the lemma.
For p > 2/3,
Pr(dr|0) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2+3p2(1− p)
Pr(dr|1) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2(1− p)+3p2(1− p)(1− p)
Pr(dr|2) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2((1− p)2+ p2)+3p2(1− p)(1− p)2
Pr(dr|3) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2((1− p)3+3p2(1− p)+ p3)
+3p2(1− p)((1− p)3+ p3).
The probability of winning when not exerting effort Pr(dr|0) consists of the proba-
bilities that the firm finds zero, one, or two pieces of information. Searching once
reduces the chances of winning because given one or two pieces of information
found by the firm, the decision is now made against the proposal only if the
regulator does not find information. A similar argument establishes that Pr(dr|2)
and Pr(dr|3) are also smaller than Pr(dr|0). Hence, all constraints (2.3.4), (2.3.5),
and (2.3.6) are slack and no positive wage induces the regulator to search for
evidence.
Proof of Lemma 3. We need to show that wˆ≥ w. Several cases have to be con-






1−5p+13p2−20p3+18p4−7p5 ≥ 0. (2.6.7)
Define the LHS of (2.6.7) as g(p). The fourth derivative g′′′′(p) = 432−840p
is decreasing and positive in the relevant range as g′′′′(p˜)> 0. Hence, g′′′(p) =
−120+ 432p− 420p2 is increasing and negative as g′′′(p˜) < 0. It follows
that g′′(p) = 26− 120p+ 216p2− 140p3 has a negative slope and is positive
throughout the range of interest as g′′(p˜) > 0. The first derivative g′(p) =
−5+26p−60p2+72p3−35p4 therefore increases but is negative as g′(p˜)< 0.
From this we know that g(p) is decreasing and positive as g(p˜)> 0 and the LHS
of (2.6.7) is positive in the relevant range.
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p−4p2+ 283 p3−13p4+10p5− 103 p6
or
1−4p+(19/3)p2−5p3+2p4− (1/3)p5 ≥ 0. (2.6.8)
Define the LHS of (2.6.8) as g(p). The fourth derivative g′′′′(p) = 48− 40p
is decreasing and positive. Hence, g′′′(p) = −30+ 48p− 20p2 is increasing
and negative as g′′′(1)< 0. Therefore, g′′(p) = 38/3−30p+24p2− (20/3)p3 is
decreasing and positive as g′′(1) = 0. The first derivative g′(p) =−4+(38/3)p−
15p2+8p3− (5/3)p4 hence is increasing and negative as g′(1) = 0. It follows
that g(p) is decreasing and positive as g(1) = 0, which implies that the LHS of
(2.6.8) is positive in the relevant range.
For 1/3 < p≤ pˆ, the regulator will not search for information for any positive
value of w and hence, wˆ≥ w is always satisfied.




p−4p2+ 283 p3−13p4+10p5− 103 p6
or
1− p− (8/3)p2+5p3−3p4+(2/3)p5 ≥ 0. (2.6.9)
Define as g(p) the LHS of (2.6.9). The fourth derivative g′′′′(p) =−72+80p is
increasing and negative in the relevant range as g′′′′(2/3)< 0. Hence, g′′′(p) =
30−72p+40p2 has a negative slope and crosses the abscissa once as g′′′(pˆ)> 0
and g′′′(2/3) < 0. It follows that g′′(p) = −16/3+ 30p− 36p2 +(40/3)p3 is
concave with a local maximum. As both g′′(pˆ) and g′′(2/3) are positive, the
second derivative is positive throughout the range of interest. The first derivative
g′(p) = −1− (16/3)p+ 15p2− 12p3 + (10/3)p4 therefore is increasing and
negative because g′(2/3) < 0. From this we know that g(p) is decreasing and
positive as g(2/3)> 0. This implies that inequality (2.6.9) strictly holds.
In the remaining interval 2/3 < p < 1, the regulator will not search for any
positive value of w and hence wˆ≥ w is satisfied.
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Proof of Lemma 4. We show that w is either smaller than the lower bound or
larger than the upper bound of the wage necessary for the other two equilibria
where the regulator searches once or twice.
We start by showing that for 0 < p < 1/2, where there are equilibria in which
the regulator searches once or twice, w1 is smaller than w2 and hence is the







can be simplified to 1− 3p+ 2p2 ≥ 0. The LHS is decreasing in the relevant
range as the derivative −3+4p is negative for 0 < p < 1/2. At 1/2, the LHS is
zero, and hence, the condition above holds.






or 3p3(1− 5p+ 7p2− 3p3) ≥ 0. Define the term in parentheses as g(p). The
second derivative g′′(p) = 14− 18p is positive and decreasing in the relevant
range as g′′(0.5) is positive. Hence, g′(p) =−5+14p−9p2 is increasing in the
negative domain because g′(0.5) is negative. This implies that g(p) is decreasing,
and we know further that it must have one root as g(0) is positive but g(0.5) is
negative. It can be shown that g(p) crosses the abscissa at p = 1/3. Hence, for
0 < p < 1/3, the relevant upper bound is given by w2 and by w1 for 1/3 < p <
1/2.
For 0 < p≤ p˜, we start by determining the relevant lower bound below which






or p(1−8p+22p2−31p3+26p4−10p5)≥ 0. Define the term in parentheses as
g(p). The fourth derivative g′′′′(p) = 624−1200p is positive in the relevant range
[0, p˜]. Therefore, g′′′(p) =−186+624p−600p2 is increasing in this range and
negative for both p = 0 and p = p˜ and hence has no root. The second derivative
g′′(p) = 44− 186p+ 312p2− 200p3 is strictly decreasing in that interval and
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takes on a positive value both at p = 0 and at p = p˜, and thus has no root in the
relevant interval. The first derivative g′(p) =−8+44p−93p2+104p3−50p4 is
negative for both p = 0 and p = p˜ and thus has no root as it is strictly increasing
in that range of p. Hence, g(p) is strictly decreasing in that interval and has one











































It follows that w is smaller than w1 up to that root. This implies that the
relevant lower bound is given by w from p = 0 up to the root and then by w1 until
p = p˜.
Next, we show that w lies below the relevant upper bound in this range given






can be simplified to 1−8p+28p2−52p3+50p4−19p5 ≥ 0. Define the LHS
of the last inequality as g(p). The fourth derivative g′′′′(p) = 1200− 1140p
is positive throughout the relevant range and hence, g′′′(p) =−312+1200p−
1140p2 is increasing. Observe that g′′′(p˜) is negative which implies that the
third derivative is negative throughout the range. Therefore, g′′(p) = 56−312p+
600p2− 380p3 is decreasing and positive, as g′′(p˜) is positive. This indicates
that g′(p) =−8+56p−156p2+200p3−95p4 increases in that range of p, and
as g′(p˜) is negative, the first derivative is negative throughout. Taken together,
we now know that g(p) is decreasing, and as g(p˜) is positive, that it has no root
in that range. The condition above holds.





p−4p2+ 283 p3−13p4+10p5− 103 p6
= w
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or −3+ 21p− 46p2 + 48p3− 30p4 + 10p5 ≥ 0. Define the LHS as g(p). The
fourth derivative g′′′′(p) =−720+1200p is increasing and negative in the rele-
vant range as g′′′′(1/2)< 0, implying a negative slope of g′′′(p) = 288−720p+
600p2. The positive value of g′′′(1/2) shows that the third derivative is positive
throughout. Hence, g′′(p) =−92+288p−360p2+200p3 increases and is nega-
tive as g′′(1/2)< 0, also implying that g′(p) = 21−92p+144p2−120p3+50p4
is decreasing. As g′(p˜)> 0 but g′(1/2)< 0 the first derivative has one root in the
range of interest. The function g(p) hence first is increasing and then decreasing,
and because both g(p˜) and g(1/2) are positive, it is positive throughout the range
of interest and hence the condition above holds. Therefore, w1 is the relevant
lower bound for this range.
Second, for the same range of p we show that
w =
c
p−4p2+ 283 p3−13p4+10p5− 103 p6
≤ c
3p2−9p3+9p4−3p5 = w1
or 3− 21p+ 55p2− 66p3 + 39p4− 10p5 ≥ 0. Define the LHS as g(p). The
fourth derivative g′′′′(p) = 936−1200p is decreasing in the positive domain, and
hence g′′′(p) =−396+936p+−600p2 is increasing. Because g′′′(1/2)< 0 the
third derivative is negative throughout, implying a negative slope of g′′(p) =
110− 396p+ 468p2− 200p3. The second derivative is positive throughout as
g′′(1/2)> 0, and thus g′(p) =−21+110p−198p2+156p3−50p4 is increasing.
Since g′(p˜)< 0 and g′(1/2)> 0, the first derivative has one root, and hence g(p)
is decreasing first and then increasing. It can be easily verified that g(p) is positive
at this root of g′(p) and hence is positive throughout, satisfying the condition
above. Therefore, there is no range of p and w below w where not searching is
the unique equilibrium.
Taken together, we can now define
w˜ =

w for 0 < p < p˙
w1 for p˙ < p < 1/2
w2 for 1/2 < p < 1
as used in the proposition.
For 1/2 < p < 1, where the equilibrium in which the regulator searches twice
also exists, we now show that the lower bound is given by w2 and that there
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also exists an area below w and above w2 where not searching is the unique





p−4p2+ 283 p3−13p4+10p5− 103 p6
=w
or −12+ 84p− 202p2 + 246p3− 156p4 + 40p5 ≥ 0. Define the LHS as g(p).
The fourth derivative g′′′′(p) = −3744+ 4800p is increasing and crosses the
abscissa once from below. This implies that g′′′(p) = 1476− 3744p+ 2400p2
first has a decreasing and then an increasing slope, and as it is positive at the root
of g′′′′(p), it is positive throughout the relevant range. From this fact we know that
g′′(p) =−404+1476p−1872p2+800p3 is increasing, and it is negative and has
no root in the relevant range as g′′(1) = 0. Hence, g′(p) = 84−404p+738p2−
624p3 + 200p4 is decreasing, and has one root as g′(1/2) > 0 but g′(1) < 0.
The original function g(p) thus has a local maximum at this root and is positive
throughout as both g(1/2) and g(1) are positive, and the condition above is
satisfied.





p−4p2+ 283 p3−13p4+10p5− 103 p6
=w
or−3+21p−64p2+111p3−102p4+37p5≥ 0 for some values of p. Define the
LHS as g(p). The fourth derivative g′′′′(p) =−2448+4440p crosses the abscissa
once from below, implying a local minimum of g′′′(p) = 666−2448p+2220p2.
As g′′′(1/2) < 0 and g′′′(1) > 0, the third derivative has one root in the range
of interest. Hence, g′′(p) = −128+ 666p− 1224p2 + 740p3 also has a local
minimum in the relevant range. Similarly, g′′(1/2)< 0 and g′′(1)> 0, such that
g′′(p) also crosses the abscissa once from below, implying one local minimum
of g′(p) = 21−128p+333p2−408p3+185p4. As both g′(1/2) and g′(1) are
positive but there are negative values of g′(p) in between, the first derivative first
crosses the abscissa from above and then again from below. Hence, g(p) first
has a local maximum and then a local minimum. As g(1/2) is positive, the local
maximum must be in the positive domain, and because g(1) = 0 and g′(1)> 0,
the graph crosses the abscissa from below at p = 1 and hence the local minimum
is in the negative domain. This implies that there must be a root in between. It
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Therefore, w2 is smaller than w for 1/2 < p < p¨ and there are levels of w between
w2 and w for which not searching is the unique equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 5. The regulator’s probability of winning contingent on the
number of searches is given by
Pr(dr|0) = 0
Pr(dr|1) = (1− p)2 p
Pr(dr|2) = 2p(1− p)p2+(1− p)2
(
2p(1− p)+ p2) .












respectively. (2.3.7) is the relevant constraint if the RHS of (2.6.10) is smaller
than the RHS of (2.6.11) or p2g(p)≥ 0 where g(p) = 1/2−2p+(3/2)p2. The
first derivative g′(p) =−2+3p crosses the abscissa once from below and hence,
g(p) is convex. It is easy to verify that g(p) has roots at p∗ = 1/3 and p = 1 and
hence is positive for values of p below p∗ and negative for values above. Thus,
(2.3.7) is binding for small p while (2.3.8) is relevant for large p and the lemma
follows.
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or 2− 11p+ 25p2 − 26p3 + 10p4 ≥ 0. Define the LHS as g(p). The third
derivative g′′′(p) =−156+240p is increasing and negative in the relevant range
as g′′′(p˜)< 0. This implies that g′′(p) = 50−156p+120p2 is decreasing, and it
is positive as its value at p˜ is positive. Hence, g′(p) =−11+50p−78p2+40p3
is increasing, and from g′(p˜) < 0 we know that it is negative. Due to this fact,
g(p) is decreasing, and as g(p˜)> 0, it is positive and the condition above holds.
For p˜ < p < 1/3, the relevant comparison is
w =
c
p−4p2+ 283 p3−13p4+10p5− 103 p6
≥ c
p−3p2+5p3−3p4 = w
or 3− 13p+ 30p2 − 30p3 + 10p4 ≥ 0. Define the LHS as g(p). The third
derivative g′′′(p)=−180+240p is increasing and negative in the range of interest
as g′′′(1/3)< 0. Hence, g′′(p) = 60−180p+120p2 is decreasing and positive
as g′′(1/3)> 0. The slope of g′(p) =−13+60p−90p2+40p3 thus is positive,
and the first derivative is negative because g′(1/3)< 0. From this we know that
g(p) is decreasing. As g(1/3)> 0, the LHS is positive throughout the range of
interest and the above condition is satisfied.
For 1/3 < p < 1, the relevant comparison is
w =
c
p−4p2+ 283 p3−13p4+10p5− 103 p6
≥ c
p− 52 p2+3p3− 32 p4
= w
or 9− 38p+ 69p2 − 60p3 + 20p4 ≥ 0. Define the LHS as g(p). The third
derivative g′′′(p) = −360+ 480p is increasing and crosses the abscissa once
from below as g′′′(1/3)< 0 and g′′′(1)> 0. Hence g′′(p) = 138−360p+240p2
is convex and has a local minimum at p = 3/4. As its value is positive at
the local minimum it is positive throughout the range of interest. Therefore,
g′(p) = −38+138p−180p2+80p3 is increasing and negative as g′(1/3) < 0
and g′(1) = 0. That being the case, the LHS decreases in p and is positive as
g(1/3)> 0 and g(1) = 0. The above condition holds.
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Proof of Proposition 2. First, we show that w is smaller than w˜ for p < 1/3. For






or 2− 11p+ 25p2− 26p3 + 10p4 ≥ 0. Define the LHS as g(p). Observe that
g′′′(p) =−156+240p is increasing and negative throughout the relevant range,
which means that g′′(p) = 50−156p+120p2 is decreasing. As g′′(p˙)> 0, the
second derivative is positive, which implies a positive slope for g′(p) =−11+
50p− 78p2 + 40p3. As g′(p˙) < 0 we know that the first derivative is negative
and by that we know that g(p) is decreasing. The fact that g(p˙)> 0 implies that
the LHS is positive throughout the relevant range and that the conditions above
holds.







or 1− 6p+ 11p2− 6p3 ≥ 0. Define the LHS as g(p). The second derivative
g′′(p) = 22−36p is decreasing and positive for p = 1/3 and thus positive in the
relevant range so that g′(p) = −6+ 22p− 18p2 is increasing. As g′(1/3) < 0,
the first derivative is negative which implies a negative slope of g(p). Together
with the facts that g(p˙)> 0 and g(1/3) = 0 we know that g(p) is positive in the
relevant range and the condition above holds.
Next we show that for values of p above 1/3, w is never below w˜. First, for
1/3 < p < 1/2, the relevant comparison is
w =
c
p− 52 p2+3p3− 32 p4
≥ c
3p2−6p3+3p4 = w1
or −2+11p−18p2+9p3 ≥ 0. Define the LHS as g(p). The second derivative
g′′(p) =−36+54p is increasing and negative for p = 1/2 and thus negative in
the relevant range, implying a negative slope of g′(p) = 11− 36p+ 27p2. As
g′(1/3)> 0 and g′(1/2)< 0, there must be one root of the first derivative in the
relevant range. This implies that g(p) is concave and has a local maximum in that
range, and because g(1/3) = 0 and g(1/2)> 0, it is positive throughout the range
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p− 52 p2+3p3− 32 p4
≥ c
3p2− 152 p3+ 152 p4−3p5
= w2
or −2+ 11p− 21p2 + 18p3− 6p4 ≥ 0. Define the LHS as g(p). The third
derivative g′′′(p) = 108−144p is decreasing and crosses the abscissa once be-
cause g′′′(1/2) > 0 and g′′′(1) < 0. This implies that g′′(p) = −42+ 108p−
72p2 is concave and has a local maximum at p = 108/144 in that range. As
g′′(108/144)< 0, the second derivative is negative throughout. The first deriva-
tive g′(p) = 11−42p+54p2−24p3 hence is decreasing in the relevant range.
As g′(1/2)> 0 and g′(1)< 0 the first derivative has one root and g(p) is concave
and has a local maximum. From g(1/2)> 0 and g(1) = 0 we can infer that g(p)
is positive in the relevant range and the condition above holds.
The second part of the proof follows from the earlier analysis. For 1/2 <
p < p¨, w2 < w from Lemma 4 and w < w from Proposition 1. Hence, whenever
w > max{w2,w} it is below w and the unique equilibrium exists for this range of
p.
Proof of Proposition 3. There are three cases. For 0 < p < 1/3, the losses in
Situation 1 L1 are larger than the losses in Situation 2 L2 if
L1 = 9p3−21p4+18p5−6p6 ≥ p−5p2+14p3−22p4+18p5−6p6 = L2
or −1+ 5p− 5p2 + p3 ≥ 0. Define the LHS as g(p). The second derivative
g′′(p) = −10+ 6p is increasing and negative throughout the relevant range as
g′′(1/3) < 0. Hence g′(p) = 5− 10p+ 3p2 is decreasing, and it is positive
because g′(1/3)> 0. It follows that g(p) has a positive slope. As g(0)< 0 but
g(1/3)> 0 it crosses the abscissa once from below in the range of interest. It can
be shown that this root lies at p = 2−√3, and hence the condition above holds
for values of p larger than that.
For 1/3 < p < 2/3, the relevant comparison is
L1 = 3p−15p2+30p3−30p4+18p5−6p6≥ p−5p2+14p3−22p4+18p5−6p6 =L2
or 1− 5p+ 8p2− 4p3 ≥ 0. Define the LHS as g(p). The second derivative
g′′(p) = 16− 24p is decreasing and positive as g′′(2/3) = 0. Thus, g′(p) =
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−5+ 16p− 12p2 is increasing and crosses the abscissa once from below as
g′(1/3)< 0 and g′(2/3)> 0. It can be shown that g′(1/2) = 0. From this we can
infer that g(p) is convex and has a local minimum. Its value at the local minimum
is zero, so the condition above holds in the relevant range of p.
Lastly, for 2/3 < p < 1, the relevant condition is
L1 = 3p−9p2+15p3−21p4+18p5−6p6≥ p−5p2+14p3−22p4+18p5−6p6 =L2
or 2−4p+ p2+ p3 ≥ 0. Define the LHS as g(p). The second derivative g′′(p) =
2+6p is increasing and positive throughout the whole range of interest, implying
a positive slope for g′(p) = −4+2p+3p2. As g′(2/3) < 0 and g′(1) > 0, the
first derivative crosses the abscissa once from below. From this we can infer that
g(p) is convex and has a local minimum. We know that this local minimum is
negative as g(2/3)> 0, g(1) = 0, and g′(1)> 0, and therefore, g(p) crosses the
abscissa once from above. It can be shown that this root lies at p =
√
3−1, and
the condition above holds for values of p smaller than that.
2.6.2 APPENDIX B: OTHER PURE-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA
We show that equilibria in pure strategies exist in which the regulator searches
once or twice given three searches by the firm.
{0,0} {1,0} {2,0} {3,0} {0,1} {1,1} {2,1} {3,1}
0 < p≤ 1/2 R F F F R R F F
1/2 < p≤ 1 R R F F R R R F
Table 2.4: Decision rule for µ f = 3 and µr = 1.
We begin with the equilibrium where the regulator searches once. In this case,
the judge decides according to the decision rule given in Table 2.4. If the expected
value of information against the proposal on the two remaining dimensions where
the regulator did not search, 2× p2+1× p(1− p) = 2p, is larger than the value of
evidence in favor of the proposal, then the decision is made against the proposal.
In the two cases where the firm has one more piece of information than the firm
({1,0} and {2,1}), the expected value of contra information is large enough to
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tip the decision towards the regulator for p > 1/2. We again assume that when
the regulator presents more than one piece of information out of equilibrium, the
judge believes that the regulator did search in all other dimensions as well and
did not discover any evidence. Hence, the decision rule under full information
applies out of equilibrium.
The following conditions must hold such that searching once is optimal for
the regulator, given three searches by the firm and the corresponding belief by the
judge, µ f = 3, µr = 1:
Pr(dr|1)w− c≥ Pr(dr|3)w−3c (2.6.12)
Pr(dr|1)w− c≥ Pr(dr|2)w−2c (2.6.13)
Pr(dr|1)w− c≥ Pr(dr|0)w. (2.6.14)
We have the following result.
Lemma 6. If and only if w1 ≤ w≤ w1 and 0 < p < 1/2, where w1 = c/(3p2−
6p3 + 3p4) and w1 = c/(3p2− 9p3 + 9p4− 3p5), there exists an equilibrium
where the regulator searches once, the firm searches three times, and the judge
has beliefs µ f = 3 and µr = 1. For 1/2≤ p < 1, only one search by the regulator
never is optimal.
Proof. First, for 0 < p < 1/2, the winning probabilities for the regulator are
Pr(dr|0) = (1− p)3
Pr(dr|1) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2 p
Pr(dr|2) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2
(
2p(1− p)+ p2)
Pr(dr|3) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2
(
1− (1− p)3)+3p2(1− p)p3.
The incentive constraint (2.6.14), which ensures that one search is better than
no search, gives the lower bound for the wage w1 = c/(3p
2−6p3+3p4). For
the moment, ignore (2.6.12). Condition (2.6.13), which ensures that one search
is more profitable than two searches, gives the upper bound for the wage, w1 =
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or p3(3− (6p−3p2))> 0. The term 6p−3p2 has its global maximum at p = 1
with value 3 and is strictly concave, hence the condition is satisfied for the relevant
range of p, 0 < p < 1/2. It remains to be checked that (2.6.12) is slack. Plugging





1− (3p−2p2)) ≥ 0. The term 3p− 2p2 is strictly concave and has its
maximum at p = 3/4. It is strictly increasing in the relevant range 0 < p < 1/2
and takes on value 1 at p = 1/2. Hence, the condition is satisfied for that range
and (2.6.12) is slack.
For 1/2≤ p < 1, the winning probabilities for the regulator are
Pr(dr|0) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2
Pr(dr|1) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2
Pr(dr|2) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2+3p2(1− p)2p(1− p)
Pr(dr|3) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2+3p2(1− p)(3p(1− p)2+ p3).
It is obvious that for any positive value of search cost c and non-negative benefit
w, the constraint (2.6.14) can never hold. Hence, an equilibrium with one search
effort by the regulator does not exist for 1/2≤ p < 1.
As the next step, we characterize an equilibrium where the regulator searches
twice. The judge decides in favor of the party that delivers more pieces of
information. In case of a tie ({0,0}, {1,1}, {2,2}) the decision is made in favor of
the regulator as the expected value of contra information on the third dimension
where no search has taken place is positive.19 We again assume that when the
regulator presents more than two pieces of information out of equilibrium, the
judge believes that the regulator did search in the third dimension as well and
did not discover any evidence. Hence, the decision rule under full information
applies out of equilibrium.
19Note that when the judge receives the information {3,3} out of equilibrium, the decision is
made for the firm.
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The following conditions must hold such that two searches are optimal for
the regulator, given three searches by the firm and the corresponding belief by the
judge, µ f = 3, µr = 2.
Pr(dr|2)w−2c≥ Pr(dr|3)w−3c (2.6.15)
Pr(dr|2)w−2c≥ Pr(dr|1)w− c (2.6.16)
Pr(dr|2)w−2c≥ Pr(dr|0)w (2.6.17)
The three conditions guarantee that the regulator prefers two searches to three,
one, and zero searches.




3p2−9p3+12p4−6p5) for 0 < p < 1/2
c/
(
3p2− (15/2)p3+(15/2)p4−3p5) for 1/2≤ p < 1,
and w2 = c/
(
3p2−12p3+24p4−24p5+9p6), there exists an equilibrium where
the regulator searches twice, the firm searches in all three dimensions and the
judge has beliefs µ f = 3 and µr = 2.
Proof. The winning probabilities for the regulator are
Pr(dr|0) = (1− p)3
Pr(dr|1) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2 p
Pr(dr|2) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2(2p(1− p)+ p2)+3p2(1− p)p2
Pr(dr|3) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2(1− (1− p)3)+3p2(1− p)(3p2(1− p)+ p3).
The upper bound for the wage w2 = c/
(
3p2−12p3+24p4−24p5+9p6) is
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or p3
(−32 + 92 p−3p2)> 0. The polynomial in parentheses is negative at p = 1
and equal to zero at p= 1. It has another root at p= 1/2 and hence is negative for
values of p below 1/2 and positive for values of p above. Taken together with the
root at p = 0 from the term p3, condition (2.6.18) does not hold for 0 < p≤ 1/2
and holds for 1/2 < p < 1. Hence, constraint (2.6.17) is binding for smaller p
and (2.6.16) for larger p.
It remains to be shown that the upper bound w2 lies above the lower bound





which is equivalent to p3(3−12p+18p2−9p3)> 0. Define the term in paren-
theses as g(p) = 3−12p+18p2−9p3. The second derivative g′′(p) = 36−54p
is positive for p = 0 and negative for p = 1 and has one root at p = 2/3. Hence,
g′(p) =−12+36p−27p2 is strictly concave and takes on value 0 at its global
maximum. The original function g(p) is positive for p = 0 and zero for p = 1. It
is non-increasing throughout [0,1], convex up to the root of g′(p) and concave
thereafter. Hence it cannot have another root in the relevant range. Taken to-
gether, the condition is above satisfied and w2 lies above w2 for 0 < p≤ 1/2. For





or p3(3− 11p+ 14p2− 6p3) > 0. Let g(p) = 3− 11p+ 14p2− 6p3. The sec-
ond derivative g′′(p) = 36−54p crosses the abscissa once from above. Hence,
g′(p) = −12+36p−27p2 is concave and has its global maximum at p = 7/9
with a value of −1/3. Thus, the original function g(p) is falling in the interval
[0,1], is positive at p = 0 and equal to 0 at p = 1, and therefore cannot have
another root in that interval. Taken together, the condition above is also satisfied
for values of p between 1/2 and 1.
CHAPTER 3
MERGERS IN BIDDING MARKETS
Abstract
We analyze the effects of horizontal mergers in a dynamic market en-
vironment consistent with the features of a bidding market where firms
have finite capacities and future demand is uncertain. We show that hori-
zontal mergers can affect market prices but only if either the largest firm
is involved in the merger or if it creates a new largest firm. A merger that
increases the capacity of the largest firm is always profitable while a merger
that creates a new largest firm may or may not be profitable.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been an active debate among economists as well as
competition policy practitioners on whether markets using auctions or auction
processes to allocate goods or services should be treated differently from “ordi-
nary” markets in antitrust cases. Firms active in such “bidding markets” have
repeatedly claimed that there is less need by competition authorities to evaluate
them because market characteristics alone ensure efficient competition even if the
relevant market is highly concentrated. A case in point is the Oracle/Peoplesoft
merger in the EU (European Commission, 2005). After the initial concern of the
European Commission (EC) that the merger would reduce the number of firms
in the enterprise application software industry from three to two (the only major
competitor being SAP), Oracle was able to successfully argue that the market
definition determined by the EC was too narrow: because contracts are awarded
by a bidding procedure, other competitors are able to enter specific tenders and
pose a competitive constraint on the merging firms. Therefore, they are part of
the market and have to be included when defining the market. A similar argument
has also been used by the EC. For example, in the Raytheon/Thales case, the EC
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states that in a bidding market, “the conditions of competition are determined
by the presence of credible suppliers, able to offer competitive alternatives to
the parties’ products”. Therefore “even relatively high market shares may not
necessarily translate into market power” (European Commission, 2001, rec. 40).1
On the other hand, Klemperer (2007) argues that most antitrust cases involving
firms active in bidding markets should be treated no differently than other cases.
Specifically, he states that “the key anti-trust challenge is simply to recognize that
the particular method of price-formation in auctions and bidding processes does
not affect the fundamental principles of antitrust” (p. 39).
In order to shed some light on the effects of mergers in bidding markets,
we analyze merger incentives and unilateral effects of horizontal mergers in a
dynamic market environment consistent with the features of a bidding market.
Firms have fixed capacities and face an uncertain number of sequentially arriving
consumers. In this framework which focuses on the interplay of capacity and
demand uncertainty, we find that without efficiency gains, any horizontal merger
increases prices from the date of the merger onwards if the largest firm is involved
in it or if a new largest firm is created through the merger. Current and future
prices are unaffected if the largest firm is not involved and decrease if a merger
creates a firm which is as large as the previously largest firm. In contrast to
traditional merger analysis, where all mergers without efficiency gains tend to
increase prices, in our model a large number of mergers does not have adverse
effects on consumer welfare. Our findings are also in contrast to the current
practice of the EC of assessing market power in bidding markets based on the
number of competitors. Our analysis suggests that the involvement of the firm
with the largest capacity in a merger or the creation of a new largest firm due to
merger is the key determinant of adverse price effects, independent of the number
of active competitors.
Three features have been identified to define an ideal bidding market (see,
e.g., Klemperer, 2007; Rasch and Wambach, 2013). First, competition is “winner
1Other European cases with the same line of reasoning include Metronet/Infraco (European
Commission, 2002) and Boeing/Hughes (European Commission, 2004). The German competition
authority (“Bundeskartellamt”) also argues that high market shares are no indicator of market
power in bidding markets in the Hochtief/Philipp Holzmann and Webasto/Edscha merger cases
(see respectively Bundeskartellamt, 1998 and Bundeskartellamt, 2009).
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take all” such that the winner of the auction receives the object for sale (or the
supply contract in a procurement setting) while all other participants come away
empty-handed. Second, each object or contract up for auction is significant in size
relative to total sales in a given period. Third, in the terms of Klemperer (2007),
“competition begins afresh for each contract, and each customer” (p. 5) if there is
repeated interaction. This implies that in subsequent auctions the fact that one
player has won a previous auction does not improve (or worsen) his position in
the current contest. We stress that this third characteristic can only be meaningful
if the market is a dynamic environment where firms interact repeatedly.
In our model, buyers arrive at the market sequentially and can buy one contract
from one of n sellers via a first-price sealed-bid auction. Contracts cannot be split
between sellers, resembling the “winner take all” feature of a bidding market.
Sellers’ capacity is constrained so that a seller’s capacity is reduced each time
it wins an auction. Future demand is uncertain. Demand uncertainty ensures
the significance of each contract up for auction in the short-term, modeling
the second characteristic of bidding markets. In line with the third feature of
bidding markets, competition starts afresh for each contract in the sense that
buyers’ preferences and firms’ costs are independent of past auctions. Any future
auction is undertaken by a new buyer, and thus the preferences of each new
buyer are independent of the result of previous auctions. Furthermore, firms have
constant costs. Therefore, although the capacity of the winning firm is reduced
permanently after winning a contract, this has no influence on the firm’s cost
function.
In this framework, we analyze the incentives to merge and find that a merger
between the largest firm and any number of smaller rivals is always profitable for
the merged firm as well as for all outsider firms. The largest firm is able to sell
each additional unit of capacity with a larger probability and at higher prices than
before the merger while the outsiders free-ride on increased prices of the insiders.
When a number of smaller firms merges and becomes the new largest firm
in the market, whether the merger is profitable or not depends on a trade-off: on
the one hand the increase in equilibrium prices allows the new largest firm to sell
its units at higher prices than before the merger, resulting in an increase in profit.
On the other hand, as opposed to before the merger, the probability of selling
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a unit for the merged firm is reduced by the merger, which is to the detriment
of the merged firm. Depending on which effect dominates, the merger is either
profitable or unprofitable. The outsider firms including the previously largest firm
always profit due to the increased prices. If smaller firms merge such that their
capacity is equal to the previously largest firm, the merger is unprofitable for the
merging firms and the previously largest firm, but profitable for the outsiders.
The merger paradox, a situation where mergers without efficiency gains are
unprofitable for the merged firm unless large parts of the industry are involved,
occurs in markets with strategic substitutes, while with strategic complements,
mergers are to the benefit of all firms.2 Different from traditional analysis, in our
framework with strategic complements, we find that mergers may or may not be
profitable depending on the capacities of the involved firms. Instead, in line with
static merger models, outsiders always profit from mergers in the industry in our
model, yielding further support for this already very robust finding.
We model firms with a common marginal cost. While restrictive, there are
numerous markets where a large fraction of total cost arises prior to the actual
sale of the product. For example, in the testimony of the Oracle/PeopleSoft
merger case in the US, a senior executive of Oracle explained that most of the cost
accrues during the development of the software while the the cost of an additional
sale of a license itself is negligible (Bengtsson, 2005).
In a dynamic market environment, it is plausible to assume demand to be
uncertain. For example, firms offering management consulting services are often
able to anticipate future tenders from specific firms or a small number of firms,
however, overall demand for a period of time, e.g., the next year, is uncertain to
some degree. Similarly, firms like Oracle or SAP in the market for enterprise
application software—where the number of employees working to implement the
2The ‘merger paradox’ originates in the contribution of Salant et al. (1983). When merging
without efficiency gains in a Cournot market, the merged firm internalizes the adverse effect of
competition on their joint profit by reducing output. Due to strategic substitutability, this leads to
the expansion of output by the outsiders to the detriment of the merged firm. Salant et al. (1983)
show that mergers are unprofitable for the merged firm unless a large fraction of the firms in the
industry are involved in it while the outsiders always profit. In contrast, Deneckere and Davidson
(1985) show in a differentiated Bertrand setting that the merged firm as well as the outsiders profit
from a merger because due to strategic complementarity, the reaction of the outsiders benefits the
merged firm.
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software is limited—may well know some of the upcoming tenders, however, it
is impossible to perfectly predict how many firms will decide to invest into a new
software system in the next years. As a result of demand uncertainty, capacity
constraints may arise. In times of economic downturn, demand may have been
overestimated such that capacity is abundant, while conversely, in situations of
unexpectedly high demand, capacity in the market may be used to the full. For
example, the strategy consulting industry in the United States was reported to
have an overcapacity of 30% in 2002 as a result of the collapse of the dotcom
bubble (The Economist, 2002).
Related literature
There is a large body of literature on the analysis of horizontal mergers starting
with the seminal contributions of Salant et al. (1983) and Deneckere and Davidson
(1985). Numerous other settings have since been analyzed, examples include
efficiency gains (Farrell and Shapiro, 1990), entry (Pesendorfer, 2005; Marino and
Zábojník, 2006), merger waves (Qiu and Zhou, 2007), remedies (Vasconcelos,
2010; Vergé, 2010), and strategic antitrust authorities (Nocke and Whinston,
2010).
Our paper is related to the literature on mergers in (static) auction markets. In
these papers, one common assumption is that merging leads to a probabilistically
lower cost post-merger, inducing an asymmetry among bidders. In this vein,
Waehrer (1999) compares asymmetric open and first-price sealed-bid auctions
where a merged firm’s cost is the maximum of a number of draws from the
same distribution where the number of draws depends on the size of the merged
entity. Waehrer and Perry (2003) analyze mergers in a static asymmetric open
procurement auction model where a merged firm’s cost is the minimum of two
draws from the identical cost distribution. Thomas (2004) examines mergers in a
one-shot procurement setting where the merged firm can either become more or
less efficient post-merger.3 In contrast to this literature, we focus on a dynamic
3Other contributions concerning mergers in auction markets focus on the econometric estima-
tion of price effects of mergers in auction markets (see, e.g., Dalkir et al., 2000 or Tschantz et al.,
2000).
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market environment with repeated auctions while assuming that the cost functions
of a merged firm remains unchanged.
A number of papers analyze repeated procurement with capacity-constrained
suppliers.4 In this mostly empirical literature, it is typically assumed that a
supplier’s cost distribution in the current period depends on a backlog, i.e., the
number of previous auctions it has won. It is particularly this assumption, which
is in conflict with the third feature of a bidding market defined above. Jofre-
Bonet and Pesendorfer (2000, 2003) propose a method to estimate a model of
repeated first-price sealed-bid procurement auctions. Using data from California
construction procurement auctions, they find that capacity constraints affect
suppliers’ bidding behavior. Suppliers with less available capacity (a larger
backlog) may have higher costs in future auctions. On the other hand, previously
won auctions may lead to a learning effect which reduces costs in later auctions.
However, their focus is on the development of the estimation strategy and, in
contrast to our paper, they do not solve their models analytically. In a similar
vein, Saini (2012) numerically solves a duopoly model of repeated procurement
auctions where a supplier’s larger backlog leads to stochastically larger costs in
the next period.5
Our paper is also related to the literature on revenue management in operations
management. In this literature, pricing strategies are derived in an environment
characterized by one firm or a small number of firms with a fixed capacity
(inventory) facing customers arriving sequentially. Examples include the sale of
airplane seats or hotel rooms. While a large number of papers focuses on pricing
of a monopolist (see, e.g., Elmaghraby and Keskinocak, 2003 for a survey of the
literature), there are a few more recent contributions who analyze situations with
competition. For example, Lin and Sibdari (2009) prove the existence of a Nash
equilibrium in a setting where n firms sell to sequentially arriving consumers using
a multinomial logic choice model. Gallego and Hu (2014) analyze a stochastic
game in continuous time where firms sell differentiated products.
4Contributions on sequential procurement without capacity constraints include Perry and
Sákovics (2003) and Thomas (2010).
5Other empirical papers analyzing data from highway construction procurement auctions
include De Silva et al. (2002, 2003) as well as De Silva et al. (2005).
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The price equilibrium of our model, which is the basis for our analysis of
horizontal mergers, is most closely related to two papers: Dudey (1992) and
Martínez-de-Albéniz and Talluri (2011). The properties and intuition of the price
equilibrium in these two contributions and in our model are qualitatively identical
and carry over initially from Dudey (1992). Dudey (1992) characterizes the
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a dynamic pricing game between
two firms with fixed capacities facing sequentially arriving customers. In a
situation where only one firm has enough capacity to serve the whole market
(i.e. the capacity configuration where a pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist in
Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983), he shows that the smaller firm sells its units first
at the monopoly price, followed by the larger firm, which also sells its units as a
monopolist. Martínez-de-Albéniz and Talluri (2011) extend the model of Dudey
(1992) to an oligopoly with an arbitrary number of firms and stochastic demand
and find similarly that in equilibrium, small firms have an incentive to slightly
undercut the largest firm such that they sell their units first while the largest firm
postpones sales until it is the monopolist. The reason is that the firm with most
capacity has the largest probability of becoming the monopolist in the market and
therefore has the largest opportunity cost of selling a unit today.
Martínez-de-Albéniz and Talluri (2011) specify demand via a stochastic
process such that in each period, a consumer may or may not arrive. In order to
maintain a finitely repeated game, they specify a maximum number of periods.
This temporal restriction has an influence on firms’ pricing behavior: as long as no
customer arrives, equilibrium prices set once the next consumer arrives decrease
as the endpoint of the game moves closer. We define demand via the probability
that another costumer arrives without specifying a maximum number of periods.6
Consumers arrive sequentially but it is not important when exactly they arrive,
i.e., the time gaps between two consumers may vary without influencing prices.
Besides substantially simplifying the analysis, this formulation allows us to avoid
the effect of the endpoint of the game on pricing such that pricing behavior in our
model is driven by the scarcity (or lack thereof) of capacity.
6In Martínez-de-Albéniz and Talluri (2011), the distribution of the expected number of
consumers can be derived by combining the probability that a consumer arrives in a period with
the maximum number of periods. In contrast, we directly define a distribution of the number of
consumers via the probability that another consumer arrives.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we present the
setup of the model as well as a simple example of pricing behavior. We present
the price equilibrium in section 3.3. In section 3.4, price effects of mergers as
well as the incentives to merge are analyzed. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 THE MODEL
Consider the market for a homogenous good where n firms are active for t =
1,2, . . . periods. In any period t, firm i, i ∈ 1, . . . ,n has a capacity ki,t . The firms’
capacities are ordered in descending sequence so that k1,t ≥ k2,t ≥ ·· · ≥ kn,t .7
Total capacity held by firms in the industry in period t is denoted by Kt =∑ni=1 ki,t .
Initially, overall capacity in the industry is (exogenously) given by K1 = ∑ni=1 ki,1.
The largest capacity by a firm in period t in the industry is denoted by κt . Each
supplier faces the same constant marginal cost c, which we normalize to be zero.
A number of consumers wants to procure a unit of the good offered by the
firms. Consumers have a common and constant willingness to pay v for one unit
of the good. Consumers arrive in the market sequentially. While we assume
without loss of generality that the first consumer arrives with certainty, whether
additional consumers will arrive in the future is uncertain. For any period t
denote by δ ∈ (0,1) the probability that another consumer arrives in the next
period so that with probability 1−δ , there is no further demand and the game
ends. This formulation of demand gives rise to a probability distribution of the
number of consumers. In that regard, it is equivalent to the demand technology of
Martínez-de-Albéniz and Talluri (2011) who indirectly model a stochastic process
of the number of consumers by defining a probability that a consumer arrives in
any period and a maximum number of periods. Besides simplifying the analysis
with our formulation we avoid last round effects present in Martínez-de-Albéniz
and Talluri (2011) in order to solely focus on the effect of capacity on pricing.
If a consumer has arrived at the market in any period, it procures one unit via a
first-price sealed-bid auction with (exogenous) reserve price v. Consumers are
myopic and only come to the market once. They buy one unit from the seller with
7Technically, we reorder firms according to their current capacities in every period.
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the lowest price if price does not exceed v. Otherwise, they do not buy a unit of
the good, leave the market and do not return.8
If a consumer is in the market in period t, each firm i with ki,t > 0 submits
a price pi,t and the firm with the lowest price wins and sells one unit to the
consumer. If multiple firms post the same lowest price, we assume that any firm
but the firm with the largest capacity in the market wins with equal probability.
In footnote 9 and in our discussion of Proposition 4 below we explain that this
tie-breaking rule does not alter any property of the equilibrium and is merely
made for technical reasons. When a firm wins a contract, it is paid its bid and its
capacity is reduced by one unit. Capacity that has been occupied is assumed to
remain so until the end of the game.
Because the game ends either if no additional consumer comes to the market or
if firms run out of capacity, it is a finite dynamic game with complete information.
We thus proceed by backward-induction to solve for a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium.
An example
We start the analysis by presenting an example where two firms with capacities
of k1,1 = 2 and k2,1 = 1 are active in the market in period 1 such that κ1 = 2 and
K1 = 3.
Assume for now that two consumers arrived previously and bought a unit
each. If a third consumer arrives (in period 3), only one supplier with one unit of
remaining capacity is active. Without competition, this supplier will set a price
equal to v, resulting in a per-unit profit of v. Working backwards, in the second
auction (period 2), two capacity constellations can arise. If k1,2 = 2 and k2,2 = 0,
supplier 1 is the only active firm and will again bid v, resulting in a per-unit profit
of v. The sum of future expected profits of this supplier when taking into account
the per-unit profit today and the expected profit from a future third auction is
v+δv.
8We argue that in equilibrium, forward-looking consumers who could potentially come to
the market multiple times will always purchase on their first arrival because equilibrium prices
increase as time progresses.
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More interestingly, if k1,2 = k2,2 = 1, both firms are active. Firms face the
following trade-off: Winning today results in a certain payoff in the current
auction while losing it will lead to the monopoly profit in a future auction but it is
uncertain if another customer will arrive. For each firm i, we derive a reservation
price at which it is indifferent between winning and losing the current auction.
For any lower price, firm i strictly prefers to lose today. Firm i is indifferent
between winning and losing if the price it is paid in the current auction is equal
to its expected future profits, that is, if p¯i,2 = δv.
In this symmetric situation of price competition, each firm anticipates that
it will be undercut by its rival as long as it does not bid the lowest (weakly)
profitable price possible such that in equilibrium both firms end up bidding their
reservation price: p∗i,2 = p¯i,2 = δv. The winner of the auction is determined by a
coin toss and is paid its bid δv. The loser of the auction will set a price v in case
of another customer, resulting in an expected profit of δv as well.
In the first period, both firms possess their initial capacities, k1,1 = 2 and
k2,1 = 1. A similar trade-off arises but now the firms have different amounts of
capacity. Firm 2 knows that it will receive δv if it does not win today and if
another customer arrives at the market. Because another customer arrives with
probability δ , the reservation price for the current contract of firm 2 is p¯2,1 = δ 2v.
If firm 1 is awarded the current contract at price p, it will still have capacity
left to be active in future auctions. In this case and if there is an additional
customer, both firms compete in two periods and firm 1 has a sum of future
expected payoffs of p+δ 2v. On the other hand, both firms compete only once if
firm 2 wins the current auction. Then, firm 1 is the monopolistic supplier in any
future auction and a sum of future expected payoffs of δv+δ 2v. Putting the two
situations together leads to a reservation price of firm 1 at which it is indifferent
between winning and losing today of p+δ 2v = δv+δ 2v⇔ p¯1,1 = δv.
A comparison of both reservation prices shows that p¯1,1 > p¯2,1. Knowing
that firm 1 will not bid below its reservation price, the best response of firm 2
is to match it because of the tie-breaking rule.9 As no firm has an incentive to
deviate, the equilibrium strategy of both firms is to set a price p∗i,1 = δv. Firm 2
9 If the smaller firm was not selected in case of a common price, firm 2 clearly has an incentive
to marginally undercut the reservation price of firm 1 in this situation. Without a discrete price
3. MERGERS IN BIDDING MARKETS 63
wins the current auction and has a sum of future expected payoffs δv while firm 1
has a sum of future expected payoffs of δv+δ 2v.
By not winning the first auction, firm 1 becomes the monopolist in all remain-
ing auctions and has to compete in one auction only. In comparison, winning
today would result in facing a competing seller again in the next auction. While
prices are determined by the reservation price of firm 1 only, such that it is in-
different between winning today or at a later date, firm 2 strictly prefers to win
earlier. The reason is that if firm 1 wins today, the equilibrium price for the next
customer will be the same as today, making winning today more attractive for
firm 2 due to demand uncertainty.
3.3 BIDDING STRATEGIES
In the previous example, the equilibrium price was shown to be determined by
the reservation price of the largest active firm. Additionally, in equilibrium the
largest firm was shown to sell its capacity without competition as a monopolist.
In this section, we show that the intuition of the example generalizes to a situation
with n firms and describe the equilibrium bidding behavior of suppliers. For any
exogenous distribution of the capacities in the industry, we have the following
result.
Proposition 4. (i) If the largest firm is strictly larger than all other firms, the
equilibrium strategy of all firms is to set a price
p∗i,t(κt ,Kt) = δ
Kt−κt v for all κt ,Kt in any period t. (3.3.1)
(ii) If there are at least two firms j with the largest capacity κt in period t, the






δKt−κt v for all κt ,Kt (3.3.2)
while all other firms set price p∗i,t(κt ,Kt) for all κt ,Kt .
grid, this incentive to undercut would lead to non-existence of equilibrium. Thus, we merely
tweak the tie-breaking rule to ‘replicate’ rational behavior with continuous prices.
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Proof. For part (i), we assume that all firms abide by the strategy specified in the
proposition, i.e. they set the candidate equilibrium price p∗i,t(κt ,Kt) in all future
periods starting in some period t. We then calculate the sum of future expected
payoffs of firms when using this strategy and show that no firm can increase
payoffs by deviating from it.
Observe that this strategy in conjunction with the tie-breaking rule ensures
that the smaller firms sell their capacity first, while the largest firm sells its units
last. The candidate equilibrium pricing strategy has three properties that help
simplify the analysis:
1. Starting in period t, the capacity of the largest firm does not change as long
as multiple firms are active because the largest firm sells its capacity last:
κt = κt+1 = · · ·= κt+(Kt−κt−1).
2. Industry capacity is reduced by one unit each period as long as the game
lasts because a sale is made in each period: Kt+1 = Kt − 1;Kt+2 = Kt −
2, . . . .
3. Using properties 1 and 2, it can be shown that the per-period profit (which
equals the winning price) of the firm winning the auction in period t is
equal to the expected per-period profit of winning an auction in any future
period, say, t+X , if at least two firms are active:
pii,t+X(κt+X ,Kt+X) = δX p∗i,t+X(κt+X ,Kt+X) = δ
XδKt+X−κt+X v
= δX+Kt−X−κt v = δKt−κt v = pii,t(κt ,Kt)
In the next step, the sum of future expected payoffs of all firms is calculated. Any
firm i with capacity ki,t , i > 1, sells all its capacity under competition and before
the largest firms sells its units as a monopolist. Thus, due to property 3, in period
t each firm except the largest firm has a sum of future expected payoffs of
VCi (ki,t ,κt ,Kt) = ki,tδ
Kt−κt v for all i > 1.
No firm i > 1 has an incentive to deviate in one period: Undercutting p∗(κt ,Kt)
cannot be profitable because it results in winning the current auction at a price
pd < p∗(κt ,Kt)which leads to a per-period profit lower than pii,t(κt ,Kt) and hence
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to V d <VCi (ki,t ,κt ,Kt). Increasing price does not increase profits for any supplier
i > 1, either. This results in losing the current auction, but because of property 3,
the deviating firm will still receive VCi (ki,t ,κt ,Kt) from future sales.
Finally the sum of future expected payoffs of the firm with the largest capacity
in the industry, i.e., firm 1, is derived. Following the candidate equilibrium
strategy, firm 1 sells its κt units when it is the sole supplier, bidding v in each of
the κt remaining periods. From the perspective of period t, this results in a sum
of future expected payoffs of
VC1 (κt ,Kt)= δ
Kt−κt v+δδKt−1−(κt−1)v+δ 2δKt−2−(κt−2)v · · ·+δκt−1δKt−κt−(κt−κt)v,
which simplifies to







Deviating by increasing its price above p∗(κt ,Kt) is not profitable for firm 1 as
this either has no effect (in case other firms are active) or leads to no sales (in
case it is the sole supplier). Firm 1 also has no incentive to undercut p∗(κt ,Kt)
as for the case that other suppliers are active, firm 1 is just indifferent between
winning and losing the current auction at price p∗(κt ,Kt). Firm 1 is indifferent if
pˆ1,t +δVC1 (κt−1,Kt−1) = δVC1 (κt ,Kt−1)















⇔ pˆ1,t = δKt−κt v = p∗(κt ,Kt).
To prove part (ii), it is first established that p∗(κt ,Kt)> p¯∗(κt ,Kt) in any period t.







1−δ < κt . (3.3.3)
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The left-hand side (LHS) of inequality (3.3.3) is increasing in δ and takes its
largest value when δ tends to 1. Then, by L’Hospital’s rule, it tends to κt .
Because δ < 1 by definition, the maximum of the LHS of inequality (3.3.3) is
never reached. It follows that strict inequality holds.
p∗(κt ,Kt)> p¯∗(κt ,Kt) implies that one of the firms with the largest capacity
κt will win the auction in period t. If there are 1 < m≤ n firms with capacity κt
in period t, bidding p¯∗(κt ,Kt) will occur m−1 times, i.e., in the following m−1
periods. Any firm that bids p¯∗(κt ,Kt) will win only one auction at that price
because the firm selected to win by the coin toss will be strictly smaller than at
least one competitor in all future periods and it will thus bid p∗(κt+1,Kt+1) after
it has won the current auction. A firm with capacity κt bidding p¯∗(κt ,Kt) thus
has a sum of future expected payoffs of
VCm (κt ,Kt) = p¯
∗(κt ,Kt)+δ (κt−1)p∗(κt ,Kt−1),
which simplifies to







We now show that p¯∗(κt ,Kt) is the price at which a firm with capacity κt is
indifferent between winning and losing in period t and hence, does not have an
incentive to deviate. If the firm wins the current auction, it is paid its bid, pI and
has a sum of future expected payoffs of a ‘small’ firm as defined in part (i) as
δVCi (ki,t−1,κt ,Kt−1) = δ (ki,t−1)δKt−1−κt v. If it loses the current auction, it
is ‘large’ in future periods and accordingly receives future expected payoffs of
δVC1 (κt ,Kt−1). The firm is indifferent between winning and losing if





δ jv− (ki,t−1)δKt−κt v = p¯∗(κt ,Kt).
All other firms with capacity ki,t < κt set p∗i,t(κt ,Kt) each period. We have already
established that there is no deviation incentive when setting this price.
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According to Proposition 4 (i), all firms set a common price p∗t in any period
t if there is a single firm with the largest capacity κt .10 Due to our tie-breaking
rule, all firms setting a common price results in a pattern of sales where small
firms sell out their capacities first and the largest firm selling its units last. While
the tie-breaking rule drives this pattern, we argue that it is merely implemented
to avoid non-existence of equilibrium caused by our assumption of continuous
prices. Without the tie-breaking rule and with a discrete price grid, the same
pattern of sales arises endogenously. This can be explained as follows. For
each firm, we can determine an equilibrium reservation value below which it is
unwilling to sell a unit in the current auction. Intuitively, if a firm waits until all
competitors have sold out their capacity, it can sell its own units at the monopoly
price v. Due to demand uncertainty, the probability of becoming the sole supplier
and thus the equilibrium reservation value is lower the smaller the firm. For the
current auction, this has the implication that any smaller firm has a incentive to
marginally undercut any proposed price of the largest firm because the largest firm
has the largest reservation value. With continuous prices, the result of marginal
undercutting is the non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. With a discrete
grid, which we do not use because it would substantially exacerbate our analysis,
the smaller firms undercut the largest competitor by one increment in any period
t. This results in the smaller firms selling their units first and the largest firm
selling its units last. The sales pattern also implies that the number of periods
with competition is minimized in equilibrium.
In part (i) of Proposition 4, the equilibrium price in period t is determined
solely by the equilibrium reservation value of the largest firm. This firm has the
largest opportunity cost of winning the current auction because winning reduces
the probability that it becomes the sole supplier, and in addition, winning an
auction under competition reduces the number of periods where it can enjoy
this privilege. As the firm with the largest amount of capacity, it has the largest
expected future payoffs to give up and hence prices least aggressive. Smaller
firms therefore match the price of the largest firm (or undercut it with a discrete
10Firms not winning the current auction in equilibrium could set any price greater than the
winning price. Without loss of generality and in order to reduce the multiplicity of equilibria we
focus on equilibria where firms set reservation prices.
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price grid) and sell their capacity earlier. In equilibrium, the firm with most
capacity sells out as a monopolist.
An upward deviation by any small firm and optimal behavior from the next
period onwards does not change the profit of the deviating firm as it will then
simply sell its units under competition at a later date, which occurs with a lower
probability but at a larger price, which makes all small firms indifferent towards
selling in the current period. A downward deviation will result in winning the
current auction but it will reduce overall expected profit of the deviator. If the
largest firm is the sole supplier in the market, it sets the reserve price each period
and clearly does not have an incentive to deviate in either direction. If smaller
rivals are active, we show that the largest firm is just indifferent between winning
and losing the current auction at the equilibrium price and thus does not have a
deviation incentive.
If multiple firms share the largest capacity, one of these firms will win the
auction in period t and become one of the small firms in the next auction (i.e.
period t+1), as p¯∗j,t(κt ,Kt)< p∗i,t(κt ,Kt). The firms sharing the largest capacity
compete head-on so that no smaller firm has an incentive to undercut them.
Only when there is one firm left with the largest capacity, there is a switch in
the equilibrium price structure back to part (i) of the Proposition so that small
firms sell under competition and the remaining largest firm sells its units as a
monopolist.
When there is a single largest firm, the equilibrium price is positive, leading
to a positive per-period profit for any firm winning a contract. Additionally, the
equilibrium price increases each period because the equilibrium marginal value
of the largest firm increases as becoming a monopolist becomes more and more
likely as time progresses. An example of the equilibrium price path with an
industry capacity of Kt = 16 and a largest firm with capacity κt = 4 is displayed
in Figure 3.1. The equilibrium price path is characterized first by a period of
low prices due to a relative abundance of capacity and due to competition and a
period of maximum prices when there is a single supplier who sells its capacity
at the monopoly price. In the transition period in between, prices increase as
concentration increases and as industry capacity decreases.
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Figure 3.1: Equilibrium price path with one largest firm with Kt = 16, κt = 4,
v = 0.5, δ = 0.5.
If more than one firm share the largest capacity the equilibrium price in period
t may even become zero or negative. Competition is so tough that the large firms
may be willing to make a loss to win the current contract in order to improve
upon their future position. In this situation, the large firms may prefer to become
a smaller firm in future auctions: They trade off a higher price for the first unit
they can sell as the sole supplier with a lower probability (if they lose the current
auction and remain the largest firm) against a higher probability of making the
first sale at competitive prices (if they win the current auction and become a
smaller firm). Depending on parameter values, these firms are willing to ‘buy’
an increase of their probability of sale. An example of the negative part of the
equilibrium price path with m = 3 firms with the largest capacity is given in
Figure 3.2.
In order to analyze the profitability of horizontal mergers, we record the
equilibrium sums of future expected payoffs derived in the proof of Proposition 4
in the following corollary.
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Figure 3.2: Equilibrium price path with m = 3 firms with the largest capacity
κt = 4, Kt = 16, v = 0.5, δ = 0.5.
Corollary 1. In equilibrium, a firm with capacity ki,t in period t receives a sum
of future expected payoffs of




jv if ki,t = κt
ki,tδKt−κt v if ki,t < κt
(3.3.4)
for all ki,t ,κt .11
While it is relatively straight-forward that a firm with a larger capacity earns
a higher sum of future expected payoffs than a smaller rival as long as both firms
are smaller than the largest firm in the market, whether the largest firm earns a
higher sum of future expected payoffs than the firm next in size is less obvious
because the largest firm sells at higher prices but with a lower probability. As
long as the largest firm does not sell, the expected per-period equilibrium profit
in any future period t +X remains constant because in each future period, the
decrease in profit due to the uncertainty of demand is exactly cancelled out by
the price-increasing effect of the reduction of overall capacity due to a sale by
11Observe that the profit of firm i if it is the largest firm can also be written in terms of a sum
as V ∗i (ki,t ,κt ,Kt) =
δKt−κt−δKt
1−δ v.
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a smaller firm in the current period, i.e., p∗i,t(κt ,Kt) = δ t+X p∗i,t+X(κt+X ,Kt−X)
(see proof of Proposition 4). Thus, from an ex-ante view, the per-period profit
of a small firm is equal across periods. This is different for the largest firm. In
equilibrium, the largest firm sets a price equal to the customer’s reservation value
after all rivals have exhausted their capacity. As there is no incentive to raise
prices beyond the reservation value further from that point onwards, the ex-ante
expected per-period profit of largest firm decreases from period to period because
of demand uncertainty. Despite its greater capacity, the largest firm may therefore
earn a lower sum of future expected payoffs than a smaller rival. This property of
the equilibrium sum of future expected payoffs of the largest firm also explains
why competition is harshest if more than one firm share the largest capacity.
We next turn to the analysis of horizontal mergers based on firms’ equilibrium
pricing behavior.
3.4 HORIZONTAL MERGERS
We model horizontal mergers as the pooling of the capacity of the firms involved
in it. In any period t, firms can decide to merge before pricing decisions are made.
A merger between i≤ n−1 firms with a sum of capacities of ∑ j k j,t then results
in a merged firm with capacity km,t = ∑ j k j,t in period t. Denote the capacities
and sums of future expected payoffs before and after a merger by subscript b and
a, respectively.
3.4.1 PRICE EFFECTS AND CONSUMER WELFARE
Competition authorities are interested in the expected changes of market prices
induced by a merger. Our first result on merger price effects concerns mergers
without the involvement or change of identity of the largest firm.12
Proposition 5. A horizontal merger between i≤ n−1 firms in period t does not
change the equilibrium price path from period t onwards as long as the capacity
and the identity of the largest firm(s) are not changed by it.
12Note that we focus on consumer welfare as total welfare remains constant in equilibrium
in our framework as changes in equilibrium price do not affect demand but merely lead to a
redistribution of surplus between buyers and suppliers.
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Proof. The proof follows from the equilibrium prices derived in Proposition 4.
Equilibrium prices in any period t are a function of κt , Kt , and the number of
largest firms in the period but they are independent of any particular ki,t . Kt
remains constant because the merger only changes the distribution of capacity in
the industry but not the total amount of capacity available in period t. As long as
κt and the number of largest firms do not change, equilibrium prices and hence
the equilibrium price path are not modified.
This result holds independent of whether there are one or more firms with
the largest capacity. In contrast to traditional merger analyses in Cournot or
(differentiated) Bertrand markets, a horizontal merger that does not change the
marginal cost of the involved firms does not influence equilibrium prices as long
as the opportunity cost of winning by the largest firm(s) is not altered by it. As
prices depend on the capacity of the largest firm(s), mergers have an effect on
prices only if (one of) the largest firm(s) in the industry participates in it or if a
merger changes the identity of the largest firm(s). We first analyze the case where
only one firm with the largest capacity exists after a merger. We record this result
in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. If a supplier with the largest capacity κt is involved in a merger
between i ≤ n− 1 firms in any period t or if there is a new single largest firm
after a merger, prices increase.
Proof. If there is a single largest firm, a merger in period t involving this firm
results in an increase of κt . If a number of firms are sharing the largest capacity, a
merger involving one of these firms will automatically lead to a single largest firm,
resulting in an increase of κt . A merger between a number of small firms such
that a new single largest firm is created through merging results in an increase of
κt . If κt increases, it follows immediately from Proposition 4 that prices increase
in all periods from period t onwards.
Additional capacity in control of the largest firm increases the probability
of the largest firm to become the sole supplier and sell out its capacity at the
maximum (monopoly) price. This reduces the influence of demand uncertainty on
the equilibrium reservation value of the largest firm and leads to less aggressive
3. MERGERS IN BIDDING MARKETS 73
pricing behavior. As the equilibrium price in any period t is determined by the
reservation value of the largest firm, this type of merger leads to an upward shift
of the equilibrium price path. In Figure 3.3, we display an example of this shift
of the equilibrium price path for an industry where the largest firm increases its
capacity by merging with a smaller rival.
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Figure 3.3: Equilibrium price paths pre-merger (solid) and post-merger (dashed)
with Kt = 16, κb,t = 4, κa,t = 7, v = 0.5, δ = 0.5.
Finally, an interesting case arises if a merger between a number of small firms
leads to a merged firm with the same capacity as the previously largest firm or
largest firms.
Proposition 7. A merger resulting in a firm with the same capacity as the m≥ 1
previously largest firms in period t leads to a price drop in period t+m−1. In
all other periods, prices are the same as in a situation without the merger.
Proof. If a merger results in m+1 firms with the same largest capacity in period t,
it follows from Proposition 4 that the equilibrium price decreases from p∗i,t(κt ,Kt)
(part (i) of Proposition 4) to p¯∗j,t(κt ,Kt) (part (ii) of Proposition 4) if m = 1. If
m > 1, the equilibrium price in period t remains at p¯∗j,t(κt ,Kt). We have shown
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in the proof of Proposition 4 (ii) that p¯∗j,t(κt ,Kt) < p∗i,t(κt ,Kt) for all κt , Kt . It
follows that one of the firms with capacity κt wins the auction in period t.
If there are m+1 firms with the largest capacity in period t instead of m, those
largest firms set price p¯∗j,t(κt ,Kt) for the next m−1 instead of m−2 periods. It
follows that there is an additional period of low prices, period t+m−1, compared
to the situation without the merger.
From period t+m onwards, there is one largest firm with capacity κt+m = κt
remaining, as would have been in the case without a merger.
Equilibrium prices decrease temporarily in case a merger creates an additional
firm with the same capacity as the previously largest firm(s) in the market as
those firms compete intensely as long as there are multiple firms with the same
largest capacity. If there are two or more firms sharing the largest capacity
initially, a merger that creates an additional firm with the largest capacity does not
influence prices immediately, however, it extends the phase of lower prices due to
intense competition between the large firms relative to a situation with a single
largest firm. Our model thus supports the notion of competition authorities that
so-called ‘catch-up’ mergers, where the number of firms with the largest capacity
is increased through merging, are beneficial to consumer welfare. An example
equilibrium price path of a catch-up merger where smaller firms have merged to
match the capacity of the (single) largest firm (κt = 4) is given in Figure 3.4.
We next turn to the analysis of the profitability of horizontal mergers in our
framework.
3.4.2 MERGER PROFITABILITY
In addition to price effects, a key question in the analysis of horizontal mergers is
merger profitability. We analyze the profitability of mergers in terms of comparing
the sums of future expected payoffs starting in the period of the merger, t. In
our framework, the profitability of mergers is simple to analyze when the largest
firm is not involved because market prices are not influenced by the redistribution
of capacity among the small firms. A merger between i≤ n−1 firms does not
change the future expected payoffs of the merging firms or any outsider firm as
long as the largest firm is not involved in the merger and as long as the identity
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Figure 3.4: Relevant part of equilibrium price path with catch-up merger (dashed)
and without merger (solid) with κt = 4, Kt = 16, v = 0.5, δ = 0.5.
of the largest firm does not change. As the expected payoffs of any ‘small’ firm
depend on the equilibrium prices determined by the largest firm, it follows that a
merger without the involvement of the largest firm does not influence expected
payoffs.
We next focus on mergers involving the largest firm(s). We first analyze the
case where a merger alters the capacity of the largest firm in the market and
as a direct consequence, equilibrium prices. We analyze merger profitability
by comparing the sum of future expected payoffs of the merged firm with the
aggregated sum of future expected payoffs of the involved firms pre-merger in
period t. Two possible constellations arise. First is the case where the largest firm
or one of the largest firms in the market merges with j ≤ n−2 smaller rivals in
some period t, resulting in an increase in capacity of the largest firm by ∑ j k j,t
units. In the next proposition, we show that such a merger is always profitable for
the merged firm as well as for all outsider firms.
Proposition 8. A merger in period t between the firm with the largest capacity
and any number of smaller rivals is always profitable for the merging firms as
well as any outsider firm.
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Proof. A merger in period t between the largest firm (firm 1) and j smaller rivals is
profitable for the merged firm if V ∗1 (κa,t ,Kt)≥ ∑ j V ∗j (k j,t ,κb,t ,Kt)+V ∗1 (κb,t ,Kt)
where κb,t is the capacity of the largest firm before the merger and κa,t = κb,t +
∑ j k j,t is the capacity of the largest firm after the merger. Using the equilibrium









































The sum in the LHS of inequality (3.4.1) as well as the right-hand side (RHS)
have ∑ j k j,t elements each. The last element of the sum of the LHS is δKt−κb,t−1,
which is also the smallest element of the LHS sum, while each element on the
RHS is δKt−κb,t . Because δKt−κb,t−1 > δKt−κb,t holds, it follows that all other
elements of the LHS sum are also larger than any element of the RHS. Thus,
inequality (3.4.1) holds for all k j,t ,κb,t . Because the largest firm is involved in the
merger, the equilibrium prices from period t onwards increase due to the merger.
It follows that all outsider firms receive a larger sum of future expected profits
post-merger.
A merger between the largest firm and a number of smaller competitors is
always profitable for the merged firm because of two positive effects on the sum
of future expected profits induced by the merger. First, the additional units of
capacity in control of the merged firm increase the probability of selling the
first unit as the sole supplier. Secondly, on the equilibrium path each acquired
unit of capacity is sold in a situation without competition, resulting in a higher
selling price as compared to selling these newly acquired units under competition.
Overall, this leads to an increase in the sum of future expected payoffs of the
merged firm. The outsiders also profit as the larger probability of becoming the
monopolist of the largest firm increases equilibrium prices from period t onwards.
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In the second case, we analyze a merger where i firms with capacities ∑ j k j,b,t
such that ∑ j k j,b,t > κb,t decide to merge. The merger creates a new largest firm
with capacity κa,t = ∑ j k j,b,t while the previously largest firm has a capacity
of k2,a,t = κb,t . Observe that the previously largest firm is always the second
largest firm after the merger. The merger is profitable for the merged firm
if V ∗1 (κa,t ,Kt) ≥ ∑ j V ∗j (k j,t ,κb,t ,Kt). We record our findings in the following
proposition.
Proposition 9. A merger between i ∈ n firms such that the merged firm becomes








δKt−κb,t −δ j) . (3.4.2)
Proof. Substituting the sums of future expected payoffs from Corollary 1 into




δ jv≥ κa,tδKt−κb,t v. (3.4.3)
We can now split up the sum on the LHS of (3.4.3) into two parts, where the first
part has κa,t−κb,t terms and the second part has κb,t terms. Similarly, the RHS
can be split up such that, when expanded, the parts have κa,t−κb,t and κb,t terms,


















Whether the merger is profitable for the merged firm depends on a trade-off
between higher prices it receives for each unit of capacity and a lower probability
of sale of each unit of capacity post-merger. On the one hand, the merged firm
sells each unit of its capacity at price v as opposed to p∗(·, ·). This is to the
benefit of the merged firm. On the other hand, since it behaves less aggressively
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in periods with competition and sells its units when it is the sole supplier, the
probability of sale decreases. This is to the detriment of the merged firm.
Because prices are strategic complements, due to a merger, the opportunity
cost of winning of the merged firm increases, inducing less aggressive pricing
behavior. This in turn allows the outsider firms to behave less aggressively as
well, which benefits all firms. Conversely, the change in the probability of sale of
the merged firm has a characteristic of substitutability in case a number of small
firms merge to become the new largest firm in the market. Then, the merged firm
sells its units when all competitors have exhausted their capacity while before the
merger, sales occur at an earlier point in time. On the other hand, the previously
largest firm sells its units at an earlier date after the merger. This can be to the
detriment of the merging firms and depending on parameter values, can render
the merger unprofitable.
The two opposing effects of a higher per-unit price and a lower probability of
sale are shown in inequality (3.4.2). The merged firm sells each unit at the constant
price v. Combined with the ex ante probability of each sale, which decreases over
time due to increasing demand uncertainty, this results in decreasing expected
per-unit profits of the merged firm. Instead, before the merger, the expected
per-unit profit (i.e. the equilibrium price multiplied by the probability of sale) for
each unit sold for the set of firms involved in the merger is constant. The LHS of
(3.4.2) gives an expression for the (decreasing) gain of each of the κa−κb units
for which the merged firm receives a larger expected per-unit profit compared to
the situation before the merger. This can be interpreted as the gain of the merger.
The RHS of (3.4.2) on the other hand quantifies the loss of merging due to κb
units for which the merged firm receives a lower expected per-unit profit than
before the merger. An illustration of this trade-off is given in Figure 3.5.
Whether the gain due to increased prices dominates the loss due to the de-
creased probability of sale depends on the capacity of the merged firm, the
capacity of the largest firm pre-merger, and on the probability of future demand.
An increase in κa,t , i.e., an increase in the share of industry capacity under
control of the merged firm, increases the likelihood that the merger is profitable.
The reason is that this increases the probability of sale of the merged firm, thus
strengthening the positive effect of increased prices. A larger capacity of the
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Figure 3.5: Trade-off of per-unit profits pre- and post-merger. Each circle (square)
depicts the per-unit profit pre-merger (post-merger). The summed-up differences
of per-unit profits in each period are given by inequality (3.4.2). Values used are
Kt = 16, κb,t = 4, κa,t = 7, v = 0.5, δ = 0.5.
largest firm before the merger (κb,t) decreases the likelihood that the merger is
profitable as pre-merger prices increase while is has no effect on post-merger
prices. The impact of the capacities of the largest firms before and after the
merger on merger profitability suggest that mergers which increase symmetry in
the industry are less likely to occur. Conversely, this can also be interpreted as a
low likelihood of mergers in industries with one firm that is significantly larger
than all rivals, i.e., in markets with a very asymmetric distribution of capacity.
After analyzing the merger incentives of the involved firms, we briefly analyze
the effect of the merger on the sum of future expected profits of the outsider firms.
As an immediate consequence of Proposition 9, all outsiders to a merger involving
the largest firm except the previously largest firm always profit from it because
the only effect on their overall expected payoffs is the increase in equilibrium
price from period t onwards which is clearly to the firms’ benefit.
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The previously largest firm also profits from the merger. After the merger, it
sells its units at lower prices p∗ but with a larger probability of sale. This clearly
leads to an increase in expected profits for the previously largest firm because by
setting prohibitively high prices as long as a competitor is active and selling all
its units as a monopolist, it could replicate its pre-merger expected profits.
3.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate the unilateral effects of horizontal mergers and
merger profitability in a bidding market where firms are capacity-constrained and
face an uncertain number of sequentially arriving consumers.
Any merger that does not involve the largest firm in the market or that does
not change the identity of the largest firm or firms does not change equilibrium
prices from the date of the merger onwards and hence does not have an adverse
effect on consumer welfare. Conversely, any merger involving the largest firm
or creating a new largest firm increases all future prices. This is because market
prices are determined by the price the largest firm expects to be paid for the first
unit of capacity it sells. A merger decreases prices temporarily if the merged firm
has the same capacity as the previously largest firm.
Our results indicate the following implications on how to treat firms active
in bidding markets from a competition policy perspective. If the merged firm
is smaller than the largest firm after the merger, there are no adverse effects on
market prices and thus our results indicate that such mergers do not pose a threat
to consumer surplus. If the merged firm is similar in size to the previously largest
firm in the market, we find that this has a positive effect on consumer surplus as
prices decrease temporarily. Thus, our analysis suggests that ‘catch-up’ mergers
should actively be supported by competition authorities. Finally, a merger that
creates a new largest firm in the market or increases the capacity of the largest
firm tends to lead to increased prices, suggesting that competition authorities
should be especially careful in merger cases involving the largest firm(s) in an
industry. Our analysis does not support the notion that mergers in bidding markets
do not pose a threat for competition as long as many firms compete for each
contract.
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The largest firm in the market always profits from a merger with smaller
rivals because all units of capacity gained through merging can be sold at a larger
price and the overall probability of sale of the largest firm is increased by adding
capacity. If a number of small firms merges in order to become the new largest
firm, whether the merger is profitable depends on a comparison of the size of
the new largest firm with the largest firm pre-merger. The merger is more likely
to be profitable if the difference in capacity between both largest firms is large
and if the previous largest firm is relatively small. Mergers are thus less likely to
occur in markets with one dominant firm with a significant size advantage over
its competitors. If the probability of further demand is small, mergers tend to be
profitable. In both scenarios, the outsider firms always profit from a merger in the
market. Due to the reduced competition, the outsiders are able to sell their units
of capacity at higher prices.
The literature has identified three key characteristics of an ideal bidding
market, which we incorporated in our model. We next discuss how these charac-
teristics enter our analysis.
In a bidding market competition is winner-take-all such that contracts cannot
be split between suppliers. We incorporate this into our model by assuming
buyers’ demand to be unity each period. Under the assumption that there are n
firms and a single largest firm, this firm has the least aggressive pricing behavior
because it expects to be the monopolist sooner and for a longer period of time
than any rival. To relax this ‘winner-take-all’ assumption, suppose that a buyer
arrives at the market in one period and demands two or more units, possibly
splitting the demand between different suppliers. Intuitively, in this situation
the largest firm has an even stronger incentive to price less aggressive than its
smaller competitors because if more units are sold at the same time, the largest
firm will become the monopolist with a larger probability. Thus, we argue that
it is possible to introduce a larger per-period demand that can be split between
sellers without altering the main intuition of the price equilibrium.
To model the significance of each contract up for auction, we assume un-
certainty with respect to future demand. If we interpret increasing demand
uncertainty (decreasing δ ) as a measure of increasing significance of a contract, it
is easy to see that different degrees of significance do not alter the main intuition.
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Only in the extremes, the results will differ: Without demand uncertainty (δ = 1),
all suppliers will set the reservation (monopoly) price in each period as all capac-
ity will be sold eventually. On the other extreme (δ = 0), the model collapses to
one-shot Bertrand competition as only a single costumer arrives.
The third characteristic of an ideal bidding market is that competition starts
afresh each period. We model this by assuming that winning a contract does
not influence a supplier’s cost function and that buyers’ preferences in any new
auction are independent of the results of previous auctions.
In the current setting, smaller firms set more aggressive prices because they
have a lower opportunity cost of winning and thus are, in terms of overall costs,
more efficient than larger competitors. Depending on how the cost function
changes after winning an auction, this effect can either be dampened or strength-
ened. As discussed in the literature review, two typical changes in the cost
function after winning an auction can be considered. If costs increase in the
number of previous auctions won (e.g., due to a larger backlog), winning an
auction results in less aggressive pricing behavior by the previous winner. As-
suming the previous winner is a smaller firm, and, if there is only one (larger)
other competitor in the market, this might result in the larger firm winning the
next auction, hence, changing our main implication of the equilibrium pricing
strategies. Conversely, if winning an auction results in a downward shift of the
cost function (e.g., due to a learning effect), this leads to more aggressive pricing
by the previous winner and an increase in the probability of winning another
contract, in line with our equilibrium prediction.
Our analysis suggests that the assumption that competition starts afresh each
period may affect our results. Allowing firms’ cost functions in future auctions
to change conditional on winning an earlier contest may change the pricing
equilibrium of our model depending on the direction of the dominating effect on
the cost function. A similar effect could be expected if buyers’ preferences depend
on the results of previous auctions. For example, a buyer may be more inclined to
buy from the winner of a previous auction due to anticipated experience effects.
One shortcoming of the current framework is the fact that sold capacity
vanishes and does not return into possession of the supplier after some time. As a
consequence, in equilibrium, it is not possible for the largest firm to be surpassed
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by other competitors. Therefore, a natural extension is the introduction of a
backlog where firms’ capacity is occupied for a limited number of periods and
then might become available again. This would result in a infinitely repeated game
with a stochastic link between periods. In the same vein, a (possibly probabilistic)
link between previously won contracts (and hence reduced available capacity)
and the costs in future auctions could be introduced. In connection with the
introduction of returning capacity this feature would allow us to analyze the
effects of efficiency gains due to learning as well as the possible influence of
previously won auctions on costs and bidding behavior. While this may give rise
to interesting new dynamics, we would still expect the result that equilibrium
prices are driven by the firm with the largest capacity to hold in this richer setting.
CHAPTER 4
THE SCOPE FOR COLLUSION UNDER DIFFERENT PRICING
SCHEMES
Abstract
We analyze and compare the incentives to collude under different pric-
ing schemes in a differentiated-products market. We show that allowing
firms to set two-part (nonlinear) tariffs as opposed to linear prices facilitates
collusion at maximum prices independent of the degree of differentiation.
However, compared to a situation where firms can only set fixed fees that
are independent of the quantity purchased, collusion at maximum prices is
less sustainable with two-part tariffs.
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we analyze the impact of different pricing structures on firms’ ability
to collude. In particular, we are interested in nonlinear pricing, a common busi-
ness practice in many industries. Examples include mobile telecommunications,
media markets, amusement parks, gas, and electricity. In these industries, the
pricing structures consist of at least two components: a fixed (entry) fee which is
independent of the quantity demanded and a linear per-unit price.
Another prominent example of an industry where prices consist of multiple
fixed and variable components is air cargo or air freight. In this market, shipping
or freight rates can be considered flat fees within a certain weight segment and/or
type of commodity. Different from that, (per-kilo and/or per-km) surcharges
typically depend on the exact chargeable weight and/or distance and can be
considered linear. Collusive agreements on a global scale have been revealed in
the air cargo industry in recent years. In June 2008, the United States Department
of Justice announced that major airlines have agreed to plead guilty and pay
fines exceeding $500 million for fixing one or more components of total air
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cargo rates (U.S. Department of Justice, 2008). Similar judgements were made
in other jurisdictions such as the European Union where fines amounted to a
total of e799 million (European Commission, 2010), Canada (over $24 million
in fines, see Canadian Competition Bureau, 2013), and New Zealand (NZ$42.5
million in fines, see Commerce Commission New Zealand, 2013).1 Many major
airlines were involved in the cartel in one or more jurisdictions including Air
Canada, Air France-KLM, British Airways, Cathay Pacific, Cargolux, Emirates,
Japan Airlines, LAN Chile, Martinair, SAS Cargo Group, Singapore Airlines,
and Qantas. Lufthansa—the largest German carrier—was also involved in the
cartel in the European Union but did not have to pay a fine because it reported the
cartel to the European Commission (European Commission, 2010). However, rail
operator Deutsche Bahn announced in December 2014 that it is suing Lufthansa,
amongst other airlines, seeking damages amounting to e1.76 billion for the
airlines’ role in the cartel (Reuters, 2014). Furthermore, an investigation by the
Swiss competition authority (COMCO) concluded that “airlines had agreed on
freight rates, fuel surcharges, war risk surcharges, customs clearance surcharges
for the U.S. and the commissioning of surcharges” and fined several airlines a
total of CHF 11 million (Swiss Competition Commission, 2014, p. 1).2
We take the firm conduct observed in the air cargo price fixing case as a
motivating example to address the question as to whether and how the possibility
to coordinate on multiple fixed and linear price components instead of agreeing
upon one (linear or fixed) collusive price only influences firms’ ability to collude.
To that end, building on Yin (2004) who models two-part tariff competition in
duopoly, we analyze the incentives to collude under different pricing schemes in
a differentiated-products setup à la Hotelling (1929) with elastic demand. Total
demand is elastic as local demand—the demand of a single customer—decreases
in price and in the distance to the respective firm (i.e., transport cost). We start
by analyzing collusive incentives in a baseline setting where firms can set and
1In contrast to the US, the European Commission did not find sufficient evidence that airlines
coordinated on freight rates but based their decision on the coordination of fuel surcharges only
(European Commission, 2010).
2The sum of fines is relatively small in Switzerland because, as COMCO reports, Lufthansa
and its subsidiary Swiss Air received full immunity because they reported the cartel. In addition,
several other airlines received significant fine reductions because of their cooperation during the
investigation.
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coordinate on a single linear or fixed price only. Turning to two-part tariffs (i.e.,
setting a fixed fee in addition to a linear price), we find that the comparison
regarding the sustainability of collusion crucially depends on the type of the
single price (linear or fixed): the scope for collusion is largest for all values of the
transport-cost parameter when firms are allowed to use fixed fees only whereas
setting linear prices only results in the lowest incentives to collude. When setting
two-part tariffs, collusion is easier to sustain compared to linear pricing but harder
to sustain compared to fixed fees.
The main effect which renders collusion more attractive under nonlinear
pricing compared to linear pricing is a relatively large profit from deviation under
linear pricing. When a firm deviates in the linear-pricing scenario to increase
market share, lowering its price has an additional positive effect on profits because
it increases local demand. This effect is absent under nonlinear pricing because
firms use the fixed part of the tariff to compete for market share. The result are
relatively low profits from deviation.
Collusion is easiest to sustain in the fixed-fee scenario. This is also caused
by relatively lower deviation profits under fixed fees relative to two-part tariffs.
Under two-part tariffs, the deviating firm is able to fine-tune local demand using
the linear part of the tariff especially when differentiation is large and optimal
deviation does not entail covering the whole market, giving rise to larger profits
from deviation and a lower incentive to collude.
Our result of intermediate incentives to collude under two-part tariffs is also
relevant for the ongoing discussion of whether the simplification of tariff struc-
tures benefits customers. For example, the British Office of Gas and Electricity
Markets (OFGEM) recently prohibited “complex multi-tier tariffs, where, for
example, customers are initially charged a higher rate, which only falls if their con-
sumption increases above certain levels” (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets,
2014, p. 1) in the markets for electricity and gas in the UK. The argument brought
forward by regulators is that increasing transparency and enhancing comparability
of prices through simplification of tariffs leads to an increase in customer surplus.
Consistent with this argument, when interpreting two-part tariffs as complex and
fixed fees as well as linear prices as simplified tariffs, our model predicts an
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increase in customer surplus in a static, competitive environment when firms are
not allowed to offer two-part tariffs.
When considering dynamic effects of simplified tariff structures, however,
our analysis points out that the effects of simplification on customer surplus are
not clear cut at all. Prohibiting firms to set two-part tariffs but allowing them to
charge simpler flat fees harms customers as it fosters collusion. However, the
incentives to collude are reduced when firms may only set linear prices instead
of two-part tariffs. As a policy implication, we stress that a careful approach to
simplifying tariff structures is necessary to prevent pro-collusive effects even if
short-term customer surplus increases.
Two-part tariffs or nonlinear pricing can be considered a form of second-
degree price discrimination (see Varian, 1989) in the sense that all customers are
offered the same schedule of price-quantity combinations. When customers are
heterogeneous in their demand, they self-select different quantities and hence
end up paying different per-unit prices. A typical example of two-part tariffs are
quantity discounts which can take a large number of different forms (e.g., loyalty
discounts, rebates).
Although price discrimination and nonlinear tariffs are important features
of antitrust concerns, the literature on the impact of different pricing schemes
on collusion is sparse.3 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study
analyzing the incentives to collude when firms compete in two-part tariffs as
opposed to linear prices. Concerning the relationship between third-degree price
discrimination and collusion, Liu and Serfes (2007) investigate the impact of
the availability of customer-specific information for market segmentation in
a linear-city model on the feasibility to collude. A higher degree of market
segmentation accompanied by a more diversified pricing structure is possible as
the quality of customer information increases. Better information has opposing
effects regarding the sustainability of collusion: on the one hand, it implies higher
3There is a large body of literature on the use of two-part tariffs in monopoly starting with
Oi (1971). As far as the formal treatment of competition with nonlinear prices is concerned,
Armstrong and Vickers (2001) as well as Rochet and Stole (2002) analyze nonlinear pricing in
a setting with both horizontal and vertical heterogeneity whereas Laffont et al. (1998) focus on
competition in two-part tariffs in the context of access pricing. We build our analysis on Yin
(2004), who focuses on a duopoly model with horizontal product differentiation, in order to isolate
the effect of different pricing schemes.
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collusive profits and harsher punishment; on the other hand, deviation becomes
more profitable. The authors show that the latter effect dominates, i.e., collusion
is harder to sustain as the firms’ ability to segment customers improves.
A related study to Liu and Serfes (2007) is Colombo (2010): the author
allows for different degrees of product differentiation (i.e., firms are not located
at the extremes of the linear city and hence are not maximally differentiated)
and analyzes perfect (or first-degree) price discrimination. With perfect price
discrimination, firms may set prices based on the exact location of a customer
(so-called delivered pricing).4 The author shows that collusion is easier to sustain
the lower transport costs are5 and that colluding on discriminatory prices is harder
than on a uniform price.6
Both Liu and Serfes (2007) and Colombo (2010) find that third-degree and
perfect price discrimination tend to reduce firms’ incentives to collude. In contrast,
our study suggests increased incentives to collude under second-degree price
discrimination.
Fong and Liu (2011) analyze intertemporal price discrimination in an overlapping-
generations model and show that, in comparison to uniform pricing, loyalty
rewards of different forms facilitate collusion. Loyalty rewards are a form of
quantity discounts and can also be interpreted as second-degree price discrimina-
tion. Customers live for two periods and demand at most one unit in each period.
Firms can then price discriminate by allowing for a discount for repeat customers.
Fong and Liu (2011) show that with loyalty discounts, deviating firms are unable
to steal the industry profit for one period and hence, collusion is more likely to
occur. This effect is further strengthened when firms can commit to offering
discounts because the commitment limits firms’ options when deciding upon the
optimal deviation strategy. In contrast to our model, firms in Fong and Liu (2011)
4This is a special case of the analysis in Liu and Serfes (2007) with maximally differentiated
firms. Further contributions investigating the implications of delivered pricing on collusion are,
among others, Jorge and Pires (2008) and Miklós-Thal (2008).
5In the standard setting with unit demand and without the ability of firms to discriminate
between customers, lower transport costs make it harder for firms to sustain collusion at maximum
prices (Chang, 1991).
6Note that in his setup, firms always punish and deviate using discriminatory prices which is
different from the present setup where punishment and deviation profits depend on the pricing
instruments available to the firms.
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can set linear prices only. If they can discriminate, they may set two different
linear prices in a given period for first-time and repeat customers. In our model,
firm can set both a linear and a fixed tariff component at the same point in time.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 4.2, we present
the setup and derive demand functions. In section 4.3, we derive profits in
the competitive, collusion, and deviation cases for linear prices (subsection
4.3.1), fixed fees (subsection 4.3.2), and two-part tariffs (subsection 4.3.3). The
resulting critical discount factors are compared in subsection 4.4. The last section
concludes.
4.2 THE MODEL
We consider a model of horizontal product differentiation à la Hotelling (1929)
with two symmetric firms 1 and 2 which are located at the extremes of the linear
city of unit length, i.e., at L1 = 0 and L2 = 1. Fixed and marginal costs are equal
to zero.7 Firms discount future profits by the common discount factor δ per
period. We compare the incentives to collude in three different pricing scenarios
in the following section:
(i) linear-price scenario (denoted by subscript L): firms compete in prices pi,L
per unit purchased (see subsection 4.3.1);
(ii) fixed-fee scenario (denoted by subscript F): firms compete in fixed fees
fi,F , i.e., customers pay a flat (subscription) fee independent of actual usage
(with i ∈ {1,2}) (see subsection 4.3.2); and
(iii) two-part tariffs (denoted by subscript T ): firms compete in tariffs which are
made up of a fixed component fi,T and a variable part pi,T charged per unit
sold (see subsection 4.3.3).
Customers of mass one are uniformly distributed along the line. Each cus-
tomer buys either from firm 1 or from firm 2. Building on Yin (2004) who
models two-part tariff competition in duopoly, we allow individual demands to be
7We will relax the assumption of zero marginal costs below.
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elastic.8 A customer who is located at x and purchases q receives the following
utility when buying from firm i:
U(x,q, pi, fi) = q− q
2
2
−q(pi+ τ|Li− x|)− fi (4.2.1)
where τ is the transport-cost parameter. We note that the quantity demanded
depends on transport cost. In the product differentiation interpretation of the
model, this would mean that mismatch costs occur for each unit purchased. Then,
qτ|Li− x| represents the total disutility suffered by a customer with preferred
product characteristics of x when consuming a product that is not ideal (and thus
not located at x but at Li). Note that the larger are q and/or |Li− x|, the greater
the disutility.
Customers maximize their utility when deciding on the quantity they want to
purchase. This implies that a customer has the following local demand at firm i
max
q
U(x,q, pi, fi)⇒ ∂U∂q = 1−q− pi− τ|Li− x|= 0
⇒ q(x, pi, fi) =
1− pi− τ|Li− x| if U(x,q, pi, fi)≥ 00 else. (4.2.2)
Customer heterogeneity with respect to product preferences is also reflected
in the individual demand which decreases as the difference in preferences and
actual product characteristics grows.
Before analyzing the three different pricing regimes and their impact on
collusion, a note on the measure for collusive stability seems in order. We
will derive the critical discount factor for the different scenarios. Using grim-
trigger strategies (see Friedman, 1971), we can compute critical discount factors
according to the well-known formula
δ ≥ δ¯ := pi
d−pic
pid−pi∗ (4.2.3)
where pic, pid , and pi∗ denote collusive profits, deviation profits and competitive
(punishment) profits, respectively. All things equal, a lower (higher) punish-
8More precisely, we use the shipping model with linear demand which is discussed in section
3.2 in Yin (2004).
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ment or deviation profit leads to a stabilization (destabilization) of the collusive
agreement whereas the opposite is true for a change in the collusive profit.
Our focus here is on the situation where the market is covered, i.e., all
customers along the line buy which is why the following is assumed to hold for
customers’ transport costs:
Assumption 1. Transport costs are not too high: 0 < τ ≤ 2/5 =: τ¯ .
The assumption guarantees that the whole market is served under any of the
pricing scenarios to be considered. For larger transport costs, firms prefer not to
serve the customers located around 1/2. As a result, firms are local monopolists
and the notion of collusion has no bite. Note that the assumption regarding
transport costs is standard in the literature (see Yin, 2004).
We proceed with the derivation of the profits and the critical discount factors
in the three scenarios.
4.3 ANALYSIS
4.3.1 LINEAR PRICING
We first consider firms’ incentives to collude in a situation where they set linear
prices. The results presented in this section are due to Rothschild (1997). We
start by analyzing the customers’ purchasing decision. Plugging the local demand
specified in expression (4.2) into the utility expression in (4.2.1) implies that the
indifferent customer located at x˜ is given by
U (x˜, pi) =U
(
x˜, p j
)⇔ x˜(pi, p j)= 12 − pi− p j2τ .
Consider the case where the indifferent customer x˜ is located in between both









In the punishment stage, firms compete by simultaneously setting linear prices.
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We can derive the competitive equilibrium prices and profits in the standard way.













respectively. As in the Hotelling model with linear transport costs and unit
demand, the model converges to Bertrand competition as differentiation vanishes
(τ → 0). Equilibrium prices increase in τ in the relevant range of τ but the
mark-up is smaller than in the model with unit demand. Larger differentiation
dampens competition, giving firms an incentive to raise prices with both elastic
and unit demand. Besides this competition effect, with elastic demand, mark-up
is lower because firms have an additional incentive to lower prices to counter the
reduction of individual demand caused by an increase in τ (elasticity effect).9 An
equivalent argument holds for the equilibrium profits.
If firms collude, they share the market equally and jointly set the optimal












Given that the competitor sticks to the collusive agreement and sets the
optimal collusive price pcL, we can derive the price set by a deviating firm i. When
deriving this price, we have to distinguish between the cases where firm i serves
(i) the whole market and (ii) shares the market with the other firm. For relatively
large values of the transport-cost parameter, it is optimal to leave some market
share to the competitor when deviating because covering the whole market would
9The separation of effects due to a change in product differentiation into competition and
elasticity effects was first discussed by Mérel and Sexton (2010).
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require a steep downward adjustment of the price. Below a cut-off value of τ , τ ′,
the optimal deviation leads to a market share of 1 of the deviating firm.
Define A :=
√
592−392τ+637τ2 and τ ′ := (4√249− 16)/233 ≈ 0.2022.
The optimal deviating price and the resulting profit are then given by
pdL =
12 − 9τ8 if 0 < τ ≤ τ ′40+14τ−A
72 if τ
′ < τ ≤ τ¯
and
pidL =
14 − τ4 − 45τ
2
64 if 0 < τ ≤ τ ′
(40+14τ−A)(208+952τ+20A+7Aτ−539τ2)
497664τ if τ
′ < τ ≤ τ¯.
Using the profits in the collusive, deviating, and punishment phases and












′ < τ ≤ τ¯
As first shown by Rothschild (1997), the critical discount factor first increases
in the transport-cost parameter and then decreases.10 We discuss the effects in
more detail in the context of Proposition 12 below. We next turn to the case of
fixed fees.
4.3.2 FIXED FEES
Fixed fees can be interpreted as a special case of two-part tariffs where the linear
part pi is set equal to zero. Then, local demand at firm i depends on the location
of the customer only: q(x) = 1− τ|Li− x|. In this case, the marginal customer is
given by
U (x˜, fi) =U
(
x˜, f j
)⇔ x˜( fi, f j)= 12 − fi− f jτ(2− τ) .











10For an in-depth analysis and explanation of the results, see Mérel and Sexton (2010) or
Rasch and Herre (2013).
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with respect to fi. We have the following result:
Lemma 8. In the punishment scenario with fixed fees, firms set an equilibrium
fixed fee of
f ∗F = τ−
τ2
2












2 f2−4 f1+2τ− τ2
2τ(2− τ) .
The second-order condition is given by
∂ 2pi1,F( f1, f2)
∂ f 21
=− 2
τ(2− τ) < 0.
Setting ∂pi1,F( f1, f2)/∂ f1 = 0, using symmetry, solving for f1, and re-substituting
into pi1,F( f1, f2) immediately leads to the lemma.
Fixed prices and profits increase in differentiation for τ as defined by Assump-
tion 1. It is well-known that differentiation softens competition, resulting in an
incentive to increase fees in order to extract more surplus from each customer
because switching suppliers becomes more costly as differentiation increases.
Profits are always larger under fixed fees compared to linear pricing. When a
fixed fee is available, firms can use it to directly target consumer surplus, resulting
in larger profits. Similar to linear pricing, as differentiation vanishes (τ → 0),
competition becomes tougher and profits converge to zero.
In the optimal collusive agreement, each firm serves exactly half of the market
and sets the fixed fee such that all surplus of the customer located at 1/2 is
extracted. We arrive at the following result:
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Proof. The customer at position x = 1/2 when buying from firm 1 has a utility
of 1/2− τ/2+ τ2/8− f1. The optimal f1 follows immediately. The collusive
profit is then given by piCi,F = f
C
i,F/2. Due to symmetry, the values for firm 2 are
identical.
In the fixed-fee scenario, firms can fully extract the surplus of the indifferent
consumer in order to maximize joint profits. Extracting all surplus of the indiffer-
ent consumer is impossible under linear pricing, resulting in a larger collusive
profit with fixed fees. Turning to the optimal deviating strategy given that the
other firms sets the collusive fixed fee, we again have to distinguish between
the cases where the deviator finds it profitable to serve the whole market or
leaves some market share to the other firm. Define τ ′′ := 2/13. We then find the
following:
Lemma 10. With fixed fees, deviation prices and profits are given by
f dF =
12 − 3τ2 + 5τ
2
8 if 0 < τ ≤ τ ′′
(2−τ)(2+3τ)
16 if τ
′′ < τ ≤ τ¯
and
pidF =
12 − 3τ2 + 5τ
2
8 if 0 < τ ≤ τ ′′
(2−τ)(2+3τ)2
256τ if τ
′′ < τ ≤ τ¯.
(4.3.4)
Proof. The optimal deviation fixed fee set by firm 1 when the other firm sets
pricing according the collusive agreement is determined by maximizing the profit
function pi1( f1, f cF) over f1. The partial derivative is given by





Observe that the second-order condition is satisfied due to Assumption 1:
∂ 2pi1,F( f1, fC2,F ;τ)
∂ f 21
=− 2
τ(2− τ) < 0
Solving the first-order condition for f1 leads to f
d,l
F = (2− τ)(2+3τ)/16. Given
f d,lF , we have to ensure that the market share of the deviating firm does not
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exceed 1, i.e., x˜
(




≤ 1⇔ τ ≥ 2/13. Thus, for τ ≥ 2/13, the optimal
deviation fixed fee is f d,lF . For τ ≤ 2/13, the optimal fixed fee is set such
that the indifferent customer is at location x = 1 and receives a utility of zero:
1 = x˜( f1, f cF)⇔ f1 = 1/2−3t/2+5t2/8 =: f d,sF . Plugging the respective fixed
fees into the profit function (4.3.1) leads to the deviation profits.
Using (4.2.3) and the respective profits we just derived, we can calculate the
critical discount factor and analyze its slope.
Proposition 10. When firms can set fixed fees only, the critical discount factor is
given by
δ¯F =
 9τ−214τ−4 if 0 < τ ≤ τ ′′2−5τ
11τ+2 if τ
′′ < τ ≤ τ¯,
where τ ′′ := 2/13.
Furthermore, δ¯F is decreasing in τ .
Proof. The first part of the lemma follows from substituting expressions (4.3.2),
(4.3.3), and (4.3.4) into inequality (4.2.3) and simplifying. For the second part,






(7τ−2)2 if 0 < τ ≤ τ ′′
−32
(11τ+2)2 if τ
′′ < τ ≤ τ¯.
∂ δ¯F/∂τ < 0 follows immediately.
The observation that the critical discount factor decreases in the scope of prod-
uct differentiation is similar to the case analyzed in Chang (1991) and Häckner
(1996). In those contributions, it is shown that with unit demand, the effect of an
increased level of product differentiation on deviation—which is less profitable as
customers incur higher transport costs—outweighs the opposing, sustainability-
decreasing effect on competitive profits which increase as firms enjoy a greater
degree of market power. As the linear price is zero in the present setup, local
demand is independent of any linear pricing component; hence, a similar result
concerning the impact of product differentiation on the critical discount factor is
obtained.
We next analyze the case where firms choose two-part tariffs.
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4.3.3 TWO-PART TARIFFS
In a situation where firms set both linear prices and fixed fees, the marginal
customer is located at
U (x˜, pi, fi) =U
(
x˜, p j, f j
)
(4.3.5)
⇔ x˜(pi, fi, p j, f j)= 12 − pi− p j2τ − fi− f j2τ(2− pi− p j− τ) . (4.3.6)
If firms compete in the punishment stage, each of them maximizes
pii
(








pi, fi, p j, f j
)
with respect to pi and fi. The first term of the profit function is the revenue
generated by charging a variable price per unit purchased while the second term
is the market share or the number of customers multiplied with the fixed fee. The
results in the competitive stage are due to Yin (2004) for the situation with a fully




















In two-part-tariff competition, the main instrument used to compete for the
indifferent customer is the fixed fee. The use of the linear price can be best
thought of as a sequential procedure. Firms determine the optimal linear price
as a function of market share and then compete for the indifferent customer and
market share by setting fixed fees.
When setting the linear price for given market shares, firms have to balance
two opposing effects caused by the fact that individual demands depend on both
price and location. As a consequence, local demand decreases for each customer
as the distance between the customer and the respective firm increases. Lowering
the linear price leads to a larger surplus for all customers. In particular, it leads
to a larger surplus of the marginal customer, i.e., the customer with the lowest
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demand at one firm, which can potentially be extracted via the fixed fee. On the
other hand, lowering the linear price leads to a larger rent given to customers
located closer to the firms. This gives firms an incentive to increase the linear
price in order to extract additional surplus from these inframarginal customers.
In the resulting compromise, firms set a linear price above marginal cost.
While the competitive profit in both the two-part-tariff and the fixed-fee
scenario is larger compared to the profits under linear prices because of the
ability of the firms to directly extract surplus via a fixed fee, it is lower under
two-part tariffs compared to the fixed-fee scenario. With two-part tariffs, firms
can gain additional profits for a given market share by setting a positive linear
price. This option is not present in the fixed-fee scenario. Anticipating this source
of additional income, firms behave more aggressively when competing for market
share using the fixed fee. The result is a lower competitive profit under two-part
tariff competition.
If firms collude, they share the market equally, and set a linear price to
maximize overall customer surplus which they partly extract via the fixed fee. We
then have the following result:
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Observe that the second-order condition is satisfied. Setting ∂pi1,T/∂ p1 = 0 and
solving for p1 yields pCi,T . The optimal fixed fee is derived by substituting p
C
i,T
into f1,T . The collusive profit follows immediately by substituting pCi,T and f1,T
into the profit function.
Observe that the linear prices under competition and collusion are identical.
This is because the firms’ market shares are identical in both scenarios. Because
the linear price can be thought of as a function of market share only, this results
in the same linear price. The optimal fixed fee is larger without competition as
firms are now able to extract all surplus of the indifferent consumer.
The largest collusive profits can be obtained with two-part tariffs while they
are lowest under linear pricing. In contrast to linear pricing, the ability to use fixed
fees allows firms to fully extract the indifferent consumer’s surplus. The avail-
ability of a linear price to extract additional surplus of inframarginal consumers
ranks the two-part-tariff scenario above the fixed-fee scenario.
Next assume that firm i’s competitor follows the collusive agreement by setting
pcT and f
c
T and define B :=
√
61−83τ+28τ2 and τ ′′′ := 14/19− 2√30/19 ≈
0.1603. The optimal deviation strategy of firm i and the resulting deviation profit
are characterized as follows:
Lemma 12. Under two-part tariffs, the optimal deviation from the collusive
agreement yields the following prices and profits:
pD1,T =
12τ if τ ≤ τ ′′′8
3 − 53τ− 13B else,
f dT =
12 −2τ+ 118 τ2 if τ ≤ τ ′′′197
9 − 2689 τ+ 18118 τ2− 259 B+ 3518τB else,
pidT =
12 − 32τ+ 78τ2 if τ ≤ τ ′′′1
27τ (5τ−8+B)
(
58−86τ+31τ2−8B+5τB) if τ ′′′ < τ ≤ τ¯.
(4.3.9)
Proof. For the proof it is helpful to rewrite the profit function of the deviating
firm as a function of the linear prices of both firms, the fixed fee of the firm that
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sticks to collusion as well as the marginal customer. Maximization is then over
pi and x˜. The idea is that the deviating firm can choose the optimal market size
and, given the market size, the optimal linear price. The profit function of firm i




(1− pi− τ x˜)2
2








where the condition for the indifferent customer was solved for firm i’s fixed fee



































































61−83τ+28τ2. Given these two critical values, we now check
whether second order conditions are satisfied, i.e., if they constitute a maximum
of the profit function. The Hessian of the profit function is given by
H(pi, x˜) =
[
−x˜ τ x˜− pi
τ x˜− pi τ pi−4τ+ 5τ22
]
.
The determinant of the Hessian is given by
D(pi, x˜) = τ pix˜+4τx− 5τ
2x˜
2
− τ2x˜2− p2i .
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It follows that the pair pD,li , x˜
D is a local maximum if D(pD,li , x˜
D) > 0 and
∂ 2pidT/∂ p
2






Observe that D(pD,li , x˜
D) is a function of τ only, define it D(pD,li , x˜
D) := K(τ).
K(τ) has three roots, one at τ = 1/2−√5/2 ≈ −0.618, a second one at τ =
83/56+
√
57/56≈ 1.617 and a third one at τ = 83/56−√57/56≈ 1.347. As
none of these roots in the range of τ as defined by Assumption 1, it follows that
K(τ) does not have any roots in the relevant range. Substituting a valid value
into K(τ) leads to K(0.1)≈ 0.537. It follows that D(pD,li , x˜D)> 0. The second
condition follows immediately, ∂ 2pidT/∂ p
2
i =−x˜ < 0 as x˜ ∈ [0,1].
The resulting optimal fixed fee f D,li follows from substituting the collusive
values of firm j, pD,li , and x˜
D into equation (4.3.6) and solving for fi. Re-
substituting the optimal values into the profit function leads to the deviation profit








For τ > τ ′′′, the optimal deviating values are given by pD,li and f
D,l
i . For τ ≤
τ ′′′, the optimal linear price is derived by substituting x˜ = 1 into the first-order





The optimal fixed fee is calculated by setting x˜ = 1, substituting firm j’s collusive









The respective profit follows immediately.
For low levels of differentiation, the deviating firm covers the whole market.
This becomes costly as differentiation increases because customers close to the
firm sticking to the collusive agreement are expensive to attract. If transport costs
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are sufficiently large, this becomes too costly such that some market share is
covered by the non-deviating firm.
Given firms’ profits in all scenarios under two-part-tariff pricing, we are now
able to calculate the critical discount factor according to condition (4.2.3). We
summarize our findings in the following lemma.
Proposition 11. The discount factor under two-part tariffs for which collusion
with grim-trigger strategies can be sustained is given by
δ¯T =




′′′ < τ ≤ τ¯,
where τ ′′′ := 14/19−2√30/19 and B :=√61−83τ+28τ2.
Furthermore, δ¯T is decreasing in τ .
Proof. The first part of the lemma follows from substituting expressions (4.3.7),
(4.3.8), and (4.3.9) into inequality (4.2.3) and simplifying. For part two of the











−1653042τ2−91392τB+795440τ+15232B−119072)) if τ ′′′ < τ ≤ τ¯,
For τ ≤ τ ′′′, it follows immediately that ∂ δ¯T/∂τ < 0. For τ ′′′ < τ < τ¯ , first note
that because B > 0 in the relevant range of τ , the first part of the expression is




G(τ) has one root at τ = 4/9 which contradicts τ ′′′ < τ < τ¯ . Plugging in a
smaller, positive value of τ , e.g., τ = 1/3 gives G(1/3) ≈ −1231.62. Because
the function is continuous, it follows that ∂ δ¯T/∂τ < 0 if τ ′′′ < τ < τ¯ .
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Consider the impact of the level of product differentiation on the critical
discount factor for two-part tariffs: as mentioned before, firms use the fixed part
of the two-part tariff to compete for the indifferent customer. As a consequence,
the impact of the product differentiation is similar to the case where firms only
charge a fixed fee, i.e., an increase in differentiation increases the sustainability
of collusion.
We are now in a position to compare profits and analyze the incentives to
collude across all three scenarios.








Figure 4.1: Comparison of competitive profits.
Consider the competitive profits illustrated in Figure 4.1. Punishment profits
are larger with two-part tariffs compared to linear pricing although intuition would
first point in the opposite direction: typically, competitive pressure is higher if
firms have more instruments available, which should lead to lower profits. In
the present case, however, firms use the fixed fee to compete for the indifferent
customer (both under a fixed fee and a two-part tariff) without having to pay
attention to (inframarginal) local demand. Once market shares are set, firms are
monopolists when it comes to optimizing local demand (or customer surplus)
through the linear price. Consumer surplus can then partly be appropriated
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through the fixed fee (see also Yin, 2004). Moreover, in the linear-pricing case,
firms cannot directly target consumer surplus but have to use the linear component
to compete for the indifferent customer. As a result, firms make a lower profit
under linear pricing which means that in this scenario, punishment is harshest.
Competitive profits are lower with two-part tariffs compared to fixed fees.
Under two-part tariffs, when competing for market shares via the fixed fee, firms
anticipate that they can earn additional profits by adjusting the linear price once
market shares are set. This additional source of income induces firms to compete
more intensely for market shares by lowering the fixed fees, resulting in relatively
lower profits under two-part tariffs.
The collusive per-firm profits in all three scenarios are displayed in Figure
4.2. When firms collude, the largest (industry) profit is obtained when two-part
tariffs are used because in this scenario firms have most instruments available
to extract customer surplus. Under linear pricing, firms are unable to extract
all surplus from the indifferent customer and hence from any customer located
closer to them because they can only set a linear price.11 When firms are able to
charge a fixed fee only, they can fully extract the indifferent customer’s surplus
but leave positive surplus to the other customers located closer to the firm(s).
Because local demand is decreasing in the distance to the firms, these customers
have a positive surplus even after paying the fixed fee. With two-part tariffs, the
additional instrument of a linear price allows firms to further increase their profits
by extracting additional surplus off those customers located in closer proximity to
their locations. In conclusion, collusion is most profitable if firms can set two-part
tariffs.
A comparison of the profits of a deviating firm yields qualitatively similar
results (see Figure 4.3). Two-part tariffs lead to the largest profit because it allows
the deviating firm to extract the largest amount of surplus from the customers.
Note that collusive as well as deviating profits decrease in the transport-cost
parameter because it decreases local demand for all customers. It follows that
11Under linear pricing, even the indifferent customer is left with a positive surplus. This is
because the firms optimize against a linear demand function. Furthermore, it can be shown that
optimal collusion involves serving the customer located at 1/2 only if τ ≤ 2/3 which holds under
Assumption 1. For larger values of τ , firms do not have an incentive to serve all customers in the
market, leading to a number of customers close to 1/2 being left out.








Figure 4.2: Comparison of collusive profits.









Figure 4.3: Comparison of deviation profits.
Overall, we find that there are opposing effects regarding the sustainability
of collusion under linear pricing compared to fixed fees and two-part tariffs. On
the one hand, incentives to collude are strongest under two-part tariffs because of
the largest collusive profits; on the other hand, the largest incentives to deviate
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are also present under two-part tariffs because it is most profitable to deviate but
also because punishment is least harsh. When comparing fixed fees and two-part
tariffs, we find that in the former scenario, the collusive and deviation profits are
smaller under fixed fees while competitive profits are larger, leading to ex ante
unclear effects between the two nonlinear pricing schemes.
In the following proposition we present our main result which sheds light on
how the different profits affect the discount factors in the three pricing scenarios
considered. Interestingly, we find that the ranking of critical discount factors is
the same for all values of τ .
Proposition 12. For all values of τ ∈ (0, τ¯) it holds that δ¯F < δ¯T < δ¯L.
Proof. We start by showing that δ¯T < δ¯L holds for 0 < τ ≤ τ¯ . At τ = 0, all
three critical discount factors are equal to 1/2. Since δ¯L is increasing at first
and both δ¯F and δ¯T are decreasing, δ¯F < δ¯T < δ¯L holds for values of τ close to
0. For τ > 0, we look for a solution to δ¯T = δ¯L with respect to τ in the regions
of τ defined by the respective deviation profits. For 0 < τ < τ ′′′ we find that
δ¯T = δ¯L only holds for τ = 0 which contradicts that 0 < τ < τ ′′′. For the area of
τ ′′′ < τ < τ ′, δ¯T = δ¯L holds for τ ≈ 0.0829 which violates τ ′′′ < τ . For τ > τ ′,
the only solution to δ¯T = δ¯L is τ = 0. Since the discount factors are continuous
functions, δ¯T < δ¯L follows.
In the second step, we show in the same way that δ¯F < δ¯T holds for 0 < τ ≤ τ¯ .
In the region where 0 < τ < τ ′′, δ¯F = δ¯T only holds for τ = 0 which contradicts
τ > 0. For τ ′′ < τ < τ ′′′, the only solution to δ¯F = δ¯T is at τ ≈ 0.1355 which
is not in the range of τ ′′ < τ < τ ′′′. For τ > τ ′′′, δ¯F = δ¯T only holds for τ = 0.
Since the discount factors are continuous functions, δ¯F < δ¯T follows.
As δ¯T < δ¯L and δ¯F < δ¯T , it follows that δ¯F < δ¯T < δ¯L.
As shown in Proposition 12, firms have relatively larger incentives to collude
if their pricing instruments include a fixed fee (i.e., in the fixed-fee and two-
part-tariff scenarios) as compared to linear prices. A graphical illustration of the
critical discount factors is given in Figure 4.4.
If a fixed fee is available, it is used as the main instrument to compete for the
indifferent customer in the punishment case and as the main means to undercut
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the collusive prices when deviating. The additional linear price (if available)
is used to optimize local demand for a given market share. This difference
in behavior is the key ingredient to explaining our results. Because we find
the effects underlying the incentives to collude in both the two-part-tariff and
fixed-fee scenario to be qualitatively similar, it is instructive to first compare the
incentives to collude under fixed-fee and linear pricing and then discuss the more








Figure 4.4: Comparison of the critical discount factors in the three pricing
scenarios.
The main effect explaining our finding that collusion is easier to sustain if
firms’ pricing instruments include a fixed fee is the relatively unattractive profit
from deviation compared to linear pricing. While deviation profits decrease in
all pricing scenarios as differentiation increases because increasing market share
becomes more costly, this effect is less pronounced under linear pricing. Under
linear pricing, firms deviate from a collusive agreement by reducing the linear
price. Besides increasing market share, this price cut has a positive effect on local
demand, leading to an increase in deviation profits. This effect is not present in
either nonlinear-pricing scenario because firms use the fixed fee as the pricing
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instrument to undercut their rival. As a result, deviation is relatively unattractive,
increasing the incentives to collude with nonlinear pricing.
When comparing the incentives to collude under fixed fees and two-part
tariffs, we find that incentives to collude are strongest under fixed fees. In the two-
part-tariff scenario deviation is slightly more attractive because the deviating firm
can use the linear price to fine-tune local demand when covering the whole market
becomes too costly. This relatively stronger incentive to deviate under two-part
tariffs overcompensates the harsher punishment and thus increased incentive to
collude in this scenario.
Extension: Positive marginal costs
Finally, we note that our results continue to hold qualitatively when introducing a
common positive marginal cost for the firms despite the inefficiency this causes
in case of fixed fees because firms then make a loss with each unit sold. As
marginal costs increase, collusion becomes easier to sustain under fixed fees and
two-part tariffs for any given value of the transport-cost parameter. The reason is
a lower utility for consumers located in the middle of the unit interval, leading to
an increased incentive by firms to serve only consumers located in their proximity
under non-linear pricing, i.e., to behave like local monopolists. The cases of
c = 1/10 and c = 1/5 are displayed in Figure 4.5.
4.5 CONCLUSION
Motivated by the recent world-wide cartel case in the air cargo industry where
firms coordinated on multiple price components, we analyze the influence of three
different pricing regimes on firms’ ability to collude. It is shown that full collusion
is easiest to sustain with fixed fees. Compared to two-part tariffs, where incentives
to collude are intermediate, this result is driven by smaller deviation profits under
fixed fees. We have shown that this pro-collusive effect dominates the opposing
effect of a softer punishment under fixed fees. Collusion at maximum prices can
be sustained for the smallest range of the discount factor under linear pricing
when compared to both nonlinear-pricing scenarios. This result is driven by the
relatively large profit of deviation under linear pricing. This is caused by an
















(b) Marginal cost c = 1/5.
Figure 4.5: Critical discount factors with positive marginal costs.
increase in local demand due to undercutting, an effect that is a lot weaker under
nonlinear pricing.
The present analysis not only helps to get a better understanding of recent
anti-trust cases but also has implications for competition policy in a more general
context: customer protection agencies as well as policymakers often criticize
firms’ complex pricing schedules designed to price discriminate between cus-
tomers. They demand that firms reduce the complexity of their pricing schemes
in order to make decisions for customers easier and more transparent. This paper
highlights that the implications of such changes are not clearcut: it is true that a
smaller number of available contracts, i.e., less instruments to price discriminate
among customers, may reduce prices customers have to pay in a static context.
Indeed, when moving from two-part tariffs to linear prices or fixed fees, we
find that consumer rents increase. However, there may be the undesired anti-
competitive consequence that collusion turns out to be easier to sustain and firms
end up generating higher supra-competitive profits in a dynamic setting when
moving to a simpler pricing regime. As a consequence, it seems of importance
for competition authorities to carefully assess how the simplification of pricing
structures—through fixed or linear prices—is achieved.
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An aspect which we have not analyzed is the strategic choice of the pricing
schedule employed by firms. If firms decide on the tariff before they collude, they
may use other pricing techniques when they choose to deviate. Furthermore, it
may be interesting to investigate the effect of the number of firms on the incentives
to collude under nonlinear pricing. We leave this as an open question for future
research.
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